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Les perspectives budgétaires du régime général sur un horizon de long terme
Un récent rapport préparé par le Comité de Politique Economique et par la Commission européenne met 
en exergue la forte augmentation attendue des dépenses de pension au Luxembourg, qui s’accroîtraient 
de plus de 7% du PIB de 004 à 050, soit la plus forte progression de l’Union européenne après le 
Portugal et Chypre . Comme l’indiquent de récentes projections de l’IGSS, le régime général de pension du 
Luxembourg est d’ailleurs susceptible d’enregistrer d’importants déficits dès 00, alors qu’il dégage pour 
l’instant de substantiels excédents . Sous l’hypothèse d’une croissance du PIB réel égale à 3% par an à 
partir de 030, les réserves du régime général laisseraient la place à une dette substantielle, qui atteindrait 
quelque 49% du PIB en 050 . Un scénario alternatif, où la croissance serait limitée à ,% par an, donne-
rait lieu à une évolution encore plus préoccupante . Dans ce dernier cas, l’endettement du régime général 
de pension se monterait en effet à 151% du PIB en 050 selon l’IGSS . Comme l’indique le graphique 
ci-dessous, les projections actualisées de la BCL, qui reposent sur les hypothèses synthétisées au tableau 
suivant, livrent des résultats similaires vers 050 . De surcroît, la prise en compte par la BCL d’un horizon 
de projection plus long, qui permet d’incorporer l’ensemble du cycle de vie des nombreux frontaliers qui 
ont rejoint la population active du Luxembourg depuis le début des années quatre-vingt-dix, met en relief 
une accélération de la détérioration budgétaire au cours des années ultérieures à 050 . La détérioration 
budgétaire serait imputable dans une large mesure à l’arrivée à l’âge de la pension d’importants contin-
gents de frontaliers et de résidents étrangers . Selon le rapport annuel 004 de l’IGSS, les frontaliers ne 
représentaient que 17,6% des prestations en 004, ce qui est nettement inférieur à leur part dans les coti-
sations – soit plus de 30% . Ce décalage donne lieu à un excédent certes substantiel, mais qui est néces-
sairement appelé à s’étioler . Même une croissance du PIB de 4% par an ne permettrait pas d’assurer la 
soutenabilité à terme du régime général de pension . En outre un tel scénario présuppose un accroissement 
peu réaliste du nombre de frontaliers, qui dépasserait le million à la fin de l’horizon de projection .
*  BCL; Monetary, Economic and Statistics Department
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Tableau 1R: Hypothèses de base des projections de pension actualisées de la BCL
Inflation Croissance du PIB Salaires réels
Productivité du 
travail
004-007 Projections d’automne 005 de la BCL (1)
008-085 1,9%  3,0% ,0% ,0%
Natalité Fertilité constante au niveau atteint en 004
Mortalité Hypothèse semblable à celle retenue par le BIT dans son étude de 000
Immigration 4 000 immigrants par an de 008 à 085
Frontaliers Dépend du taux de croissance postulé (variable résiduelle)
Taux de participation au marché 
du travail
Augmentation graduelle pour les femmes et stabilité pour les hommes . Les femmes 
représenteraient par conséquent 45% de la population assurée en 085, au lieu de 39% 
en 004 . Par hypothèse, le taux de chômage des résidents serait constant .
(1) Les simulations décrites ci-joint ont été effectuées avant la finalisation des projections de printemps 006 de la BCL . Sur un 
horizon de long terme, l’inclusion de ces projections ne modifierait cependant les résultats commentés ci-dessous que de 
façon marginale .
Dans un ouvrage publié en 004, Franco Modigliani et Arun Muralidhar (004) affirment que de nombreux 
problèmes inhérents aux systèmes de pension par répartition pourraient être palliés, voire même éradiqués 
grâce à la mise en place de mécanismes de capitalisation « defined benefits » . Le présent encadré évalue 
la pertinence d’une telle proposition dans le cas spécifique du Luxembourg . Par souci de simplicité, il est 
supposé que la proposition de Modigliani et Muralidhar serait appliquée à l’ensemble du régime général 
de pension . Or les auteurs eux-mêmes considèrent que dans certains cas, une capitalisation partielle pour-
rait se justifier .
Graphique 1R: Projections de pension actualisées: les principaux résultats budgétaires
1. Evolution des réserves (+) ou des engagements (-) du régime général de pension 
(en % du PIB)5
2. Nombre correspondant de frontaliers
Sources: BIT, IGSS, STATEC, calculs BCL .
Mise en œuvre dans le cadre luxembourgeois des propositions de Modigliani et Mural-
idhar
Dans un premier stade, la BCL a simulé « à politique inchangée par ailleurs » la mise en œuvre graduelle 
des propositions de Modigliani et Muralidhar, à savoir la transition d’un régime de pension régi par la 
répartition à un système fonctionnant sous l’égide d’un fonds public (le « Fonds » dans la suite du texte), 
dont les avoirs pourraient être gérés avec le concours de sociétés privées . A l’instar du présent régime, 
ce Fonds payerait des pensions selon le principe des « defined benefits », qui serait compatible avec la 
formule de calcul des pensions actuellement en vigueur au Luxembourg . Un système de « swap » entre le 
Fonds et l’Etat permettrait de garantir à tout moment le respect des engagements « defined benefits », 
même en cas de fléchissement imprévu du rendement des réserves . En vertu de ce swap, l’Etat effectuerait 
un transfert spécifique en faveur du Fonds en cas de rendement inférieur à un taux de référence donné, 
tandis qu’un transfert en sens inverse surviendrait lorsque le rendement excéderait ce seuil . Par hypothèse, 
la réforme serait mise en œuvre dès décembre 007 . A cette date, les réserves du régime général seraient 
dans leur intégralité transférées au Fonds . Les prestations de pension feraient également l’objet d’un trans-
fert au Fonds, qui s’effectuerait cependant de manière très graduelle . Les pensions payées à un affilié ne 
seraient en effet prises en charge par le Fonds qu’au prorata des cotisations payées par cet affilié à partir 
de la mise en œuvre de la réforme . Les autres prestations dont cet affilié bénéficie seraient toujours régies 
par le régime général de répartition . A titre d’exemple, un affilié ayant effectué l’ensemble de sa carrière 
avant la mise en œuvre de la réforme resterait à charge du régime de répartition pendant l’intégralité de 
sa période de pension, même après 008 . En revanche, un affilié qui aurait versé des cotisations pendant 
30 ans au 31 décembre 007 et qui presterait 10 années de travail additionnelles après cette date verrait 
ses pensions futures prises en charge par le Fonds à raison d’un quart, les trois-quarts restants demeurant 
à charge du régime général de répartition . Il convient de noter que le mécanisme de transfert revêtirait 
avant tout une dimension institutionnelle . Il n’affecterait pas les affiliés qui, par convention, bénéficieraient 
tous du même système de calcul des pensions, quel que soit par ailleurs l’organisme payeur (Fonds ou 
régime classique) . 6
Tableau 2R: Application de la proposition Modigliani-Muralidhar au Luxembourg : 
transfert immédiat des réserves, transfert graduel des dépenses au Fonds, croissance du PIB 
de 3% par an en volume, ratio de dépenses compatible avec les projections de pension de la 
BCL et rendement réel des réserves égal à 4,4%



































  1. 2. 3. =6.*7. 4.=1.+2.-3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.=1.+8. 10.=9.-7.
008 3 . 4 .0 0 .0 7 . 90 . 0 . 0 .5 0 .5 43 .6 3 .1
009 3 . 5 .5 0 .1 8 .5 114 .1 0 .6 0 .7 0 .6 43 .8 3 .0
010 3 . 7 .0 0 .3 9 .9 138 .3 1 . 0 .6 0 .3 43 .5  .9
011 3 . 8 .4 0 .4 31 . 16 .6  .1 1 . 0 .7 43 .9  .7
01 3 . 9 .9 0 .6 3 .4 187 . 3 .1 1 .0 0 .4 43 .6  .5
013 3 . 11 .4 0 .9 33 .7 11 .8 4 .3 1 .7 0 .8 43 .9  .
014 3 . 1 .9 1 . 34 .9 36 .5 5 .7 1 .6 0 .3 43 .5 1 .9
015 3 . 14 .5 1 .6 36 .0 61 . 7 .  .3 0 .7 43 .8 1 .6
016 3 . 16 .0  .0 37 . 86 .0 8 .9  .1 0 . 43 .3 1 .
017 3 . 17 .5  .4 38 . 310 .6 10 .7  .9 0 .4 43 .6 0 .7
018 3 . 19 .0  .9 39 .3 335 .3 1 .6  .8 19 .9 43 .1 0 .3
019 3 . 0 .5 3 .5 40 . 359 .7 14 .7 3 .6 0 .1 43 .3 19 .7
00 3 .  .0 4 .0 41 . 384 .0 17 .0 3 .6 19 .6 4 .7 19 .1
05 3 . 9 .3 7 .9 44 .5 500 .5 9 .9 6 .6 18 .6 41 .8 15 .
030 3 . 35 .8 1 .3 46 .6 604 .1 4 .8 8 .8 16 .4 39 .6 10 .8
035 3 . 41 .3 17 . 47 . 690 . 54 .8 31 .4 14 . 37 .3 5 .9
040 3 . 45 .5 1 . 47 .6 757 .0 65 .9 3 .1 10 .9 34 .1  .0
045 3 . 48 .8 5 .4 46 .6 806 .8 76 .1 33 .4 8 .0 31 . 0 .0
050 3 . 51 . 8 .0 46 .4 844 .4 84 .3 33 . 5 . 8 .4 0 .0
055 3 . 53 .1 31 .0 45 . 871 .6 90 .8 34 . 3 . 6 .3 0 .0
060 3 . 54 .3 3 . 45 . 890 .6 95 . 33 .8 1 .6 4 .8 0 .0
065 3 . 55 .1 34 .0 44 .3 90 .4 97 .8 34 .7 0 .8 3 .9 0 .0
070 3 . 55 .6 34 .0 44 .8 911 . 99 .0 34 .4 0 .3 3 .5 0 .0
075 3 . 56 .1 35 .3 43 .9 917 .3 99 .5 35 .5 0 . 3 .3 0 .0
080 3 . 56 .3 35 . 44 .3 91 . 99 .7 35 .3 0 .1 3 .3 0 .0
081 3 . 56 .3 35 .9 43 .6 91 . 99 .7 36 .0 0 .1 3 .3 0 .0
08 3 . 56 .4 35 .4 44 . 91 .9 99 .8 35 .4 0 .1 3 . 0 .0
083 3 . 56 .4 36 . 43 .4 91 .8 99 .9 36 . 0 .1 3 . 0 .0
084 3 . 56 .4 35 .6 44 .0 9 . 99 .9 35 .6 0 .0 3 . 0 .0
085 3 . 56 .4 36 .4 43 . 91 .9 100 .0 36 .4 0 .0 3 . 0 .0
Sources: BIT, IGSS, STATEC, calculs BCL  . Basé sur Modigliani et Muralidhar (004) .
Comme l’indique la colonne 6 du tableau ci-dessus, qui illustre la mise en œuvre au Luxembourg de la 
proposition de Modigliani et Muralidhar conditionnellement à une croissance économique de 3% par 
an sur la période 008-085, ce mécanisme de transfert des prestations donnerait lieu à une transition 
assez graduelle . Seule une petite moitié des pensions du régime général serait prise en charge par le 7
Fonds en 030 et la proportion transférée au Fonds n’excéderait 90% qu’après 050 . La transition serait 
cependant plus rapide que dans les scénarios élaborés pour les Etats-Unis par Modigliani et Muralidhar, 
car la durée de la carrière est fréquemment inférieure à 40 ans au Luxembourg . L’intégralité des prestations 
de pension serait transférée au Fonds à la fin de la période de projection . Les pensions (et les dépenses 
afférentes, notamment de nature administrative) atteindraient alors 36,4% de la masse contributive, contre 
0,5% en 008 . Cette proportion, nommée « ratio de dépenses » dans le reste du texte, reflète notam-
ment l’incidence de l’arrivée à l’âge de la pension d’importants contingents de travailleurs frontaliers et 
étrangers . L’évolution du ratio, qui figure à la colonne 7 du tableau, est directement extraite des projections 
budgétaires illustrées au graphique 1R .
Par hypothèse, le financement par le Fonds des dépenses de pension futures serait assuré par une cotisa-
tion constante, calculée en pourcentages de la masse contributive à l’instar de l’actuelle contribution de 
4% (soit 3 fois 8% à charge des employés, des employeurs et de l’Etat, respectivement) . Ce taux constant, 
repris à la première colonne du tableau R, serait calibré afin de permettre au Fonds d’atteindre à la fin de la 
période de projection le niveau d’actifs compatible avec le respect de la contrainte budgétaire intertempo-
relle sur un horizon infini, le tout sous l’hypothèse implicite d’une stabilisation du rapport prestations/masse 
contributive après l’horizon de projection . Le respect de cette contrainte intertemporelle est strictement 
équivalent à un critère alternatif, qui revient à choisir le niveau de cotisation compatible avec la stabilisation 
des ratios de soldes budgétaires et d’actifs à la fin de la période de projection (convergence vers un équilibre 
de « steady state »; voir l’annexe 4) . Ces critères permettent de conférer un contenu précis à la notion de 
soutenabilité à terme . Leur respect prémunit le régime de pension d’un double écueil, à savoir un niveau 
d’actifs nets ne permettant pas de couvrir les prestations de pension futures à la fin de la période de projec-
tion ou un déclin de ces actifs à la fin de ce même horizon, qui révèlerait l’instabilité de l’équilibre .
Dans le cas luxembourgeois et pour autant que la croissance du PIB atteigne 3% de 008 à 085, le taux 
de cotisation compatible avec les critères de soutenabilité précités s’établirait à un peu plus de 3% de la 
masse contributive . Ce taux postule notamment un taux réel de rendement des actifs du Fonds de l’ordre 
de 4,4% par an, le portefeuille du Fonds étant par hypothèse composé de 35% d’actions et de 65% 
d’obligations . Si un tel rendement peut a priori sembler élevé, il paraît raisonnable à l’aune de l’évolution 
des marchés financiers au cours des 0 ou 30 dernières années ou de l’expérience de divers fonds 
étrangers, par exemple le Government Pension Fund en Norvège . En outre, le taux de 4,4% est inférieur 
à raison d’environ 1% au taux postulé par Modigliani et Muralidhar dans leurs propres simulations, rela-
tives aux Etats-Unis . Enfin, une analyse de sensibilité démontre que la convergence vers l’équilibre de long 
terme ne serait pas remise en cause si le taux de rendement réel de référence était ramené à 3,4% par an . 
Il s’ensuivrait naturellement un taux de financement requis plus élevé, de l’ordre de 8% tout au long de 
la période de simulation . Ce dernier taux demeurerait cependant nettement inférieur au taux de cotisation 
requis en l’absence de réforme, qui pourrait atteindre voire même excéder 40% des revenus contributifs 
au cours de l’horizon de projection . La même analyse de sensibilité révèle que le taux de cotisation requis 
pourrait être ramené à 17% de la masse contributive vers la fin de l’horizon de projection en cas de rende-
ment réel égal à 5,4%, soit le taux considéré dans le cas des Etats-Unis par Modigliani et Muralidhar . 
L’adoption par la Chambre des Députés en 004 d’une loi visant à assurer une plus grande diversification 
de la réserve de compensation du régime général de pension est de nature à induire un rendement accru 
de la réserve de compensation . Un tel objectif revêt une considérable importance au Luxembourg en raison 
du niveau absolu élevé de cette réserve .
En début de période, le financement des pensions requis par le mécanisme de transition (voir la colonne 
9 du tableau R) serait élevé, car à la contribution constante de 3,% s’ajouterait le coût des « pensions 
de répartition » (voir la colonne 8 du tableau), à savoir les pensions qui n’ont pas encore fait l’objet d’un 8
transfert au Fonds et sont de ce fait toujours financées par le truchement du régime général . Le « coût de 
transition » correspondant, dont il est fréquemment question dans la littérature sur les systèmes de capi-
talisation, permettrait d’amorcer un cercle vertueux . Il en résulterait en effet l’accumulation d’importants 
excédents dès le début de la période de transition . La sédimentation de ces surplus induirait une montée 
en puissance des réserves, avec à la clef de substantiels revenus du patrimoine (voir la colonne ) . Ces 
derniers renforceraient à leur tour l’accumulation initiale d’actifs . La transition vers l’équilibre de « steady 
state » serait alors assurée, du moins sous les hypothèses précitées . Les surplus du régime de pension 
dépasseraient 40% des revenus contributifs – soit 16% du PIB – dès 00, tandis que le ratio de réserves 
d’équilibre serait de l’ordre de 400% du PIB . Les perspectives budgétaires du régime de pension et au-
delà de l’ensemble des administrations publiques luxembourgeoises seraient bien évidemment des plus 
favorables dans de telles conditions .
Cet équilibre paraît cependant peu réaliste, pour deux raisons . En premier lieu, il postule une considérable 
ponction financière en début de période . Du fait de l’importance du coût de transition, les ressources 
devant être mobilisées afin d’assurer le financement des pensions du secteur privé devraient atteindre 
près de 44% de la masse contributive dès 008, à comparer avec un taux de cotisation actuellement égal 
à 4% . Le surcoût de près de 0% de la masse contributive – soit de 8% du PIB – pourrait certes être 
financé par d’autres biais que les seules cotisations . Au total, il semble cependant constituer un obstacle 
rédhibitoire à la mise en place d’un régime de capitalisation, du moins à politique inchangée . En second 
lieu, le mécanisme proposé donnerait lieu à des réserves certes disproportionnées, mais dont le niveau 
élevé refléterait l’importance des déficits primaires en fin de période . En vertu de la contrainte budgétaire 
intertemporelle, les actifs de fin de période doivent en effet être égaux à la valeur actualisée des déficits 
primaires futurs . En d’autres termes, les actifs présents doivent couvrir les dépenses futures . Or les déficits 
seraient de l’ordre de 13% des revenus contributifs – soit 36% (le ratio de dépenses) moins 3% (le taux 
constant de contributions canalisées vers le Fonds) – à la fin de l’horizon de simulation et, par hypothèse 
et pour les besoins de l’actualisation, au-delà de cet horizon . Dans de telles conditions, seul un niveau de 
réserves très élevé permettrait de garantir le respect de la contrainte budgétaire intertemporelle .
Deux aménagements: plafonnement du financement et suspension temporaire de 
l’ajustement aux salaires réels
Un cheminement plus réaliste vers la capitalisation est présenté au tableau ci-après, qui intègre deux 
aménagements d’importance . En premier lieu, le transfert de recettes au Fonds ne serait pas d’emblée fixé 
au niveau du taux constant de cotisation, comme l’illustre la première colonne du tableau . Il serait choisi de 
telle manière que le taux global de financement requis (cotisations Fonds + coût résiduel des pensions de 
répartition ; voir la colonne 9) demeure inférieur à un plafond donné . Par hypothèse, ce plafond serait fixé 
à 6% de la masse contributive en 008 et il augmenterait graduellement par la suite pour atteindre 7% 
en 01 . En dépit de cet amoindrissement des recettes initiales du Fonds, ce dernier serait à tout moment 
en mesure de financer ses dépenses de pension (voir la colonne 3),  ces dernières n’étant de toute manière 
transférées au Fonds que de façon graduelle .
En second lieu, l’importante progression du ratio de dépenses serait quelque peu endiguée . Il est en effet 
supposé que l’ajustement des pensions aux salaires réels, qui a lieu tous les deux ans au Luxembourg, 
serait suspendu de 007 à 017 . Il en résulterait une nette diminution du ratio de dépenses (19,6% en 
00, contre 3,6% dans le scénario du tableau R), sans diminution du pouvoir d’achat des pensions . Le 
taux de remplacement du salaire par la pension en serait bien évidemment affecté, mais ce taux est élevé 
au Luxembourg pour une carrière complète, comme l’atteste une récente étude de l’OCDE (005) .9
Tableau 3R:  Application de la proposition Modigliani-Muralidhar au Luxembourg : 
tableau 2R avec plafonnement du financement requis et suspension de l’ajustement aux 
salaires réels de 2007 à 2017




































  1. 2. 3. =6.*7. 4.=1.+2.-3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.=1.+8. 10.=9.-7.
008 5 .8 4 .1 0 .0 9 .8 73 .1 0 . 0 . 0 . 6 .0 5 .8
009 6 .4 4 .5 0 .1 10 .7 80 .1 0 .6 0 .0 19 .9 6 .3 6 .3
010 6 .9 4 .9 0 . 11 .5 87 .6 1 . 19 .9 19 .6 6 .5 6 .6
011 7 .4 5 .3 0 .4 1 .3 95 .6  .1 19 .7 19 .3 6 .7 7 .0
01 8 .0 5 .8 0 .6 13 . 104 . 3 .1 19 .6 19 .0 7 .0 7 .4
013 8 .3 6 .4 0 .8 13 .9 113 .0 4 .3 19 .5 18 .6 7 .0 7 .5
014 8 .7 6 .9 1 .1 14 .5 1 .1 5 .7 19 .4 18 .3 7 .0 7 .6
015 9 .1 7 .5 1 .4 15 . 131 .5 7 . 19 .3 17 .9 7 .0 7 .7
016 9 .6 8 .0 1 .7 15 .9 141 .1 8 .9 19 . 17 .5 7 .0 7 .9
017 9 .9 8 .6  .0 16 .5 151 .0 10 .7 19 .1 17 .0 7 .0 7 .9
018 10 .4 9 .  .4 17 . 161 .1 1 .6 19 .0 16 .6 7 .0 8 .0
019 10 . 9 .9  .9 17 . 170 .6 14 .7 19 .7 16 .8 7 .0 7 .3
00 10 .7 10 .4 3 .3 17 .8 180 .4 17 .0 19 .6 16 .3 7 .0 7 .4
05 11 .5 13 .3 6 .6 18 . 4 .9 9 .9  .1 15 .5 7 .0 4 .9
030 13 .3 15 .6 10 . 18 .7 61 .8 4 .8 3 .9 13 .7 7 .0 3 .1
035 15 . 17 .5 14 .3 18 .4 90 .5 54 .8 6 .1 11 .8 7 .0 0 .9
040 18 .0 18 .9 17 .6 19 .3 313 .7 65 .9 6 .6 9 .1 7 .0 0 .4
045 0 .4 0 . 1 .0 19 .6 334 .3 76 .1 7 .7 6 .6 7 .0 0 .0
050  .7 1 .5 3 . 1 .0 355 .1 84 .3 7 .5 4 .3 7 .0 0 .0
055 4 .0  .8 5 .7 1 .0 375 .4 90 .8 8 .3  .6 6 .6 0 .0
060 4 .0 3 .7 6 .6 1 .1 390 .7 95 . 8 .0 1 .3 5 .3 0 .0
065 4 .0 4 .4 8 .1 0 .3 400 .3 97 .8 8 .7 0 .6 4 .6 0 .0
070 4 .0 4 .8 8 . 0 .6 407 .5 99 .0 8 .4 0 .3 4 . 0 .0
075 4 .0 5 . 9 . 19 .9 41 . 99 .5 9 .4 0 . 4 .1 0 .0
080 4 .0 5 .4 9 .1 0 . 415 .3 99 .7 9 . 0 .1 4 .1 0 .0
081 4 .0 5 .4 9 .7 19 .6 415 .3 99 .7 9 .8 0 .1 4 .0 0 .0
08 4 .0 5 .4 9 . 0 .1 415 .8 99 .8 9 .3 0 .1 4 .0 0 .0
083 4 .0 5 .4 9 .9 19 .5 415 .7 99 .9 9 .9 0 .0 4 .0 0 .0
084 4 .0 5 .4 9 .4 0 .0 416 .0 99 .9 9 .4 0 .0 4 .0 0 .0
085 4 .0 5 .4 30 .1 19 .4 415 .7 100 .0 30 .1 0 .0 4 .0 0 .0
Sources: BIT, IGSS, STATEC, calculs BCL  . Basé sur Modigliani et Muralidhar (004) .
La conjonction des deux aménagements précités permettrait d’amoindrir considérablement les incon-
vénients du processus de transition illustré au tableau R . La progression de 4% (le taux de cotisation 
actuel) à 6, puis 7% de la masse contributive ne paraît nullement hors de portée, d’autant que ces  
et 3% de financement additionnel ne représenteraient que 0,8 et 1,% du PIB, respectivement . Ces mont-
ants sont d’ailleurs du même ordre de grandeur que le transfert additionnel de l’Etat central au régime de 
pension qu’a envisagé le FMI à l’occasion de sa récente mission Article IV au Luxembourg (voir IMF (006)) . 
En outre, ces ressources supplémentaires pourraient être collectées à travers la mise en œuvre de différentes 10
mesures ponctuelles . Le choix et le dosage de ces mesures (hausse des contributions de pension, transferts 
additionnels de l’Etat central, financement alternatif, etc .) sont bien entendu du seul ressort des autorités .
En dépit du caractère plus graduel de la transition et grâce aux mesures de consolidation additionnelles, 
le processus de transition s’apparenterait à un cercle vertueux . L’équilibre de long terme serait bel et bien 
atteint à la fin de la période de transition, avec à la clef des résultats budgétaires favorables . Le Fonds 
enregistrerait en effet des excédents de l’ordre de 8% du PIB, tandis que les réserves se stabiliseraient 
à plus de 160% du PIB . La soutenabilité à terme du système de pension serait assurée, du moins en 
l’absence de chocs négatifs . De surcroît, ces résultats budgétaires exceptionnels viendraient conforter les 
finances publiques de l’ensemble des administrations publiques, ce qui concourrait à préserver le Luxem-
bourg d’une violation de la norme de référence de 3% de déficits . Cette situation serait évidemment de 
nature à grandement renforcer la stabilité de l’économie luxembourgeoise .
Un avantage décisif du cheminement vers la capitalisation: une moindre sensibilité 
aux inflexions de la croissance du PIB
Le mécanisme de transition illustré au tableau 3R permettrait en outre de protéger le système de pension 
des conséquences d’inflexions de la croissance économique . Cet avantage serait particulièrement bienvenu 
au Luxembourg, dont la petite taille concourt à exacerber la volatilité des indicateurs macro-économiques . 
L’évolution du financement requis sous différents scénarios de croissance est présentée au graphique R sous 
deux régimes alternatifs, à savoir un simple alignement sur la règle selon laquelle les réserves ne peuvent 
être inférieures à 1,5 fois le montant annuel des prestations dans le cadre du régime actuel et d’autre part le 
mécanisme présenté au tableau 3R . Sous le présent régime, les taux de cotisation subiraient de plein fouet les 
inflexions de la croissance économique . En revanche, le système de capitalisation dérivé de Modigliani et Mural-
idhar amortirait considérablement les aléas de la croissance économique . Ce résultat s’explique principalement 
par le fait que le ratio de réserves tend – du moins toutes autres choses égales par ailleurs – à s’améliorer 
lorsque survient un fléchissement de la progression du dénominateur du ratio, soit la masse contributive . Or par 
hypothèse cette dernière croît au même rythme que le PIB dans les simulations présentées ci-dessus . Dans de 
telles circonstances, la réforme recommandée par Modigliani et Muralidhar constitue une assurance contre les 
chocs de croissance négatifs, qui ne sont nullement à exclure dans une petite économie ouverte . 
Graphique 2R: Evolution du taux de financement requis sous différents scénarios de croissance
(En pourcentages des revenus contributifs)
Sources: BIT, IGSS, STATEC, calculs BCL .
Note: il est supposé que le maintien du cadre actuel donnerait lieu à un taux de rendement réel des réserves égal à ,6% par 
an, la gestion de portefeuille active du Fonds se traduisant par un rendement réel plus élevé, égal à 4,4% . L’évolution 
divergente des taux de cotisation illustrée au graphique ne s’explique que marginalement par cette hypothèse .11
Eléments de conclusion
Le cheminement vers un système de capitalisation « defined benefits » présenté au tableau 3R présente-
rait au total de nombreux avantages, notamment une bien moindre vulnérabilité aux inflexions de la 
croissance économique, la restauration de la soutenabilité financière à long terme du régime général de 
pension et dans la même foulée une amélioration sensible des perspectives budgétaires des administra-
tions publiques considérées dans leur globalité, avec à la clef un respect bien plus aisé des dispositions 
du Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance . A ces avantages macro-économiques s’ajouterait sur un plan 
plus micro-économique une sécurité financière accrue pour les affiliés du régime, puisque le Fonds aurait 
précisément pour mission de garantir à tout moment l’équilibre actuariel du système, en couvrant les 
engagements futurs par un niveau approprié de réserves . L’équilibre actuariel nécessiterait d’ailleurs des 
réserves d’un ordre de grandeur bien supérieur à celui de l’actuelle réserve de compensation, à l’instar de 
la situation prévalant dans des pays tels que la Norvège (voir le Government Pension Fund) ou les Pays-Bas 
(voir en particulier le fonds de pension ABP) .
Le Luxembourg devrait mettre à profit une fenêtre d’opportunité d’une dizaine d’années, au cours de laquelle 
le ratio de dépenses devrait demeurer inférieur à l’actuel taux de cotisation, soit 4% .  C’est précisément 
au cours d’une telle période que le Luxembourg serait en mesure d’amorcer à un coût supportable le proc-
essus de convergence vers un niveau suffisant de réserves . Le coût de financement total n’excède jamais 
7% de la masse contributive dans la simulation reprise au tableau, alors que le taux de cotisation est 
déjà égal à 4% actuellement . La convergence vers l’équilibre actuariel, qui est loin d’être acquis actuelle-
ment, nécessiterait certes une suspension limitée dans le temps de l’ajustement des pensions aux salaires 
réels . Cette mesure ne donnerait cependant nullement lieu à un déclin du pouvoir d’achat des pensions, 
puisque ces dernières feraient toujours l’objet d’un ajustement au niveau des prix . En outre, elle renforce-
rait considérablement la sécurité financière du système, tant au niveau macro-économique qu’en ce qui 
concerne les affiliés individuels . Enfin, si le préfinancement requis est relativement important, le coût de 
l’attentisme serait quant à lui considérable . Ainsi, la proposition présentée au tableau 3R s’assortirait sous 
les hypothèses précitées d’un prélèvement sur la masse contributive de l’ordre de 4% en fin de période 
de simulation, qui serait pratiquement égal au taux de cotisation actuel . Le taux correspondant pourrait 
atteindre voire même excéder 40% en l’absence de mesures nouvelles, ce qui pénaliserait la compétitivité 
de l’économie luxembourgeoise et porterait gravement préjudice à l’équité entre les générations .
Abstract
The Luxembourg private sector pension system (“régime général de pension”) is at crossroads . On the one 
hand, the current budgetary situation of the system appears extremely favourable . On the other hand, 
projections based on reasonable assumptions suggest that the pension regime is not sustainable over a 
long-term horizon . Pension benefits are indeed bound to increase steeply when large contingents of cross-
border and immigrant employees will retire . 
The primary objective of the paper is to assess whether a solution proposed by Modigliani and Muralidhar, 
where pensioners are gradually transferred from pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to a public fund in accordance with 
the defined benefit principle, is suitable to the Luxembourg situation . A baseline funding scenario designed 
in a stepwise manner and under reasonable return assumptions illustrates how fruitful such a solution 
could be in Luxembourg, provided that a significant prefunding effort takes place at the beginning of the 
transition period . In the steady state, this scenario would lead to very comfortable reserves and budgetary 
surpluses with no additional cost in terms of long-term, equilibrium contribution rates . These very favour-
able results would be achieved in spite of a continuously increasing pension cost ratio induced by ageing 
and by the gradual retirement of large contingents of cross-border workers . Another particularly attractive 1
feature of the baseline funding scenario presented in the paper – especially in the context of a small and 
very open economy – is that it would mitigate in an effective way the impact on the pension regime of 
adverse GDP growth developments . By contrast, PAYG does not provide a sound basis for a social security 
scheme as contributions are very sensitive to small changes in the key macroeconomic variables . Finally, 
the baseline funding scenario is reasonably resilient to alternative return or demographic assumptions . 
However, even the funding system would have to be monitored in a rigourous way . 
To sum up, the currently favourable situation of the private sector pension regime should be considered 
as a window of opportunity during which the pension system should set aside the large assets required 
in order to cover future pension liabilities . This would mark the onset of a virtuous circle, where increasing 
assets and the related property incomes would offset the rising cost of pension benefits and at the same 
time mitigate adverse macroeconomic developments . 
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Introduction
As illustrated in IGSS (006), the current budgetary situation of the Luxembourg private sector pension 
system is extremely favourable, with large surpluses and the accumulation of substantial reserves . However, 
as illustrated also in IGSS (006) and in Chapter 1 of this paper, the pension system does not appear 
sustainable over the long-term . Pension benefits are indeed bound to increase steeply in the next decades, 
when large contingents of cross-border and immigrant employees will retire . 
The primary objective of this paper is to assess the extent to which funding, along the lines proposed in 
Modigliani and Muralidhar (004), would alleviate the long-term budgetary challenges to the private 
sector pension regime (“régime général de pensions”) . The latter regime is organised on a pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) basis, whereas the scheme proposed in Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) would rest on funding, 
with two important distinguishing features . First, this funding system would revolve around a “New Fund” 
under the aegis of the public sector . According to the authors, a “pension market” with atomised compe-
tition between several private funds would be suboptimal, as it would induce substantial administrative 
costs and would penalise the poorest and less informed investors . Second, the solution proposed by 
Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) would be a “defined benefit” and not a “defined contribution” scheme . 
In the Luxembourg context, this means that pension benefits could still be calculated based on the current 
pension formula – with a fixed component and coefficients that are proportional to past incomes . 
After a concise presentation of the Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) funding system in Chapter , this 
framework is fined tuned to the current Luxembourg context in a stepwise manner in Chapter 3 . First, 
the reserves of the general regime and the upward shift in pension expenditure projected in the future 
are integrated into the Modigliani/Muralidhar framework in section 3 .1 .  Funding would give way to a 
very favourable steady state equilibrium in the Luxembourg context, but the required financing would be 
extremely burdensome at the beginning of the funding process (“transition costs”) . An alternative transi-
tion path with more gradual prefunding and the suspension of the adjustment of pension to real wages 
during a limited period of time is therefore proposed in section 3 . in order to alleviate the transition 
problem . Under reasonable assumptions, this “baseline funding scenario” would enable Luxembourg to 
reap very substantial long-term benefits – inter alia very comfortable budgetary indicators – with a realistic 
transition burden . By contrast, contributions would jump dramatically – possibly to about 40% –  under a 
“wait-and-see approach” where the currently favourable situation of the pension regime would encourage 
complacency . Luxembourg would then become an unattractive place for labour . The currently favourable 
situation should be considered as a “window of opportunity” instead, during which the transition “cost” 
would enable Luxembourg to set aside large assets . This would mark the onset of a virtuous circle, where 
increasing assets and the related property incomes would offset the rising cost of pension benefits . 
Another particularly attractive feature of the funding process presented in section 3 . . is its limited sensi-
tivity to GDP growth developments (section 3 .3) . This result illustrates that PAYG does not provide a sound 
basis for a social security scheme as contributions are very sensitive to small changes in the key variables, 
whereas funding provides a buffer to make the system more stable . Finally, although the baseline funding 
scenario seems quite resilient to alternative returns or demographic developments, it is per se not immune 
from external shocks . This calls for a continuous monitoring of the system (see the sensitivity analysis 
carried out in section 3 .4) .14
1. The challenges to the sustainability of the luxembourg private sector 
pension system
1.1  Financial situation and peculiarities of the private sector pension regime
From the yardstick of simple indicators like the current budgetary balance and the level of reserves, the 
financial situation of the Luxembourg pension system is extremely favourable . As shown in Chart 1, the 
Luxembourg general pension regime, which confines itself to the private sector, is indeed characterised by 
a substantial and rather stable net lending capacity . The latter reached EUR 59 million in 004, namely 
 .1% of GDP .1 The surplus increased in a continuous way from 1997 to 000 owing to a marked decrease 
in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio in a context characterised by high economic growth . This evolution more 
than offset the steady increase in the expenditure ratio observed from 1990 to 1996 . 
Chart 1 – Expenditure, revenue and overall balance of the general pension regime2
As percentages of GDP
Sources: IGSS (001, 005), STATEC .
Note: Total expenditure are corrected for the impact of one-off effects in 00 
(baby-year transfer) and 004 (transfer to Union des Caisses de Maladie) .
Revenues are mostly composed of social contributions, which are directly linked to the wage bill via a 4% 
contribution rate .3 The revenue-to-GDP ratio has been less volatile than the expenditure ratio over the nine-
ties . The reserves held by the general pension regime amounted to 4% of GDP at the end of 004 .
However, the further continuation of this favourable situation is far from ensured . Luxembourg presents 
many peculiarities, whose impact has been favourable so far . However, they are likely to turn negative 
at some point into the future . A first salient characteristic is the high reliance of the Luxembourg 
economy on cross-border workers . According to data published by STATEC (1995, 00 and 005) 
and by Berger (005), foreign commuters would represent about 37% of the workforce at the end of 004 
once the employees of international organisations are disregarded . Although they were already an impor-
tant component of the workforce as far back as in the beginning of the 1980s, this is to a large extent a 
recent phenomenon, since the number of those workers recorded a considerable increase in the recent 
past . In addition, the average age of cross-border workers is quite low . Turnover rates, age structures and 
especially average pensions observed in the past may not provide accurate measures of future trends in 
such a dynamic context .
   IGSS (2005). Once an exceptional transfer to Union des Caisses de Maladie is disregarded.
2   Old age, invalidity and survival pensions. 
   The employees, employers and the State share this burden in an equal measure (8% each).15
The situation depicted in the case of cross-border workers prevails mutatis mutandis for an-
other peculiarity of Luxembourg, namely the large inflow of foreign residents. The average 
annual inflow observed over the nineties has indeed reached about 4,000 individuals.4 The 
total inflow was therefore of about the same magnitude as the inflow of cross-border work-
ers.
Chart 2 – Evolution of the number of cross-border workers
In thousands
Sources: STATEC (1995, 00 and 005) and BCL calculations prior to 1995 .
Note: Net number of cross-border workers, disregarding the employees of interna-
tional organisations .
The most important similarity between foreign residents and the cross-border population is their impact on 
the average age of the total workforce . Commuter and foreign workers are indeed younger-than-average . 
The average age of the active cross-border population insured with the general pension regime reached 
37 years for men and 35 years for women in 003 .5  This is the major reason behind the large surpluses 
recorded by the general pension regime over the last years . As new foreign and commuter workers are 
relatively young, they account for a large proportion of all pension contributions . At the same time, they 
represent a disproportionately low proportion of pension expenditure . Active cross-border workers alone 
contributed about 31% of social contributions in 004 . At the same time, they received only 17% of 
total pension expenditure . As a result, they accounted for most of the pension regime surplus observed in 
004 .
A reverse situation could prevail into the future, when the currently active foreign and cross-border workers 
will retire . The related negative impact could of course be compensated by the positive impact of the 
arrival of new waves of such workers on future social contributions . The crucial question for the sustain-
ability of the Luxembourg pension regime is therefore whether the future stream of cross-border and 
foreign resident workers will be sufficient to ensure that such compensation takes place . The answer is far 
from straightforward, because it depends on a multitude of factors, for instance the age structure of the 
“stock” and of the flows of cross-border and foreign workers, the average duration of their careers, the 
influence of immigration on the fertility rate and above all the impact of foreign and cross-border workers 
on macroeconomic developments . 
The intricate nature of any fiscal projection in Luxembourg is further magnified by the vulnerability of the 
Luxembourg economy to idiosyncratic shocks . Due to a buoyant activity in the financial sector over 
the last two or even three decades, Luxembourg has achieved a sustained rate of economic growth, 
   STATEC.
5   IGSS (200).16
which helped contain the expenditure-to-GDP ratio . However, it should not be taken for granted that this 
trend will continue unscathed in the future . In addition, some sectors of the Luxembourg economy might 
become more mature and yield lower growth rates . The evolution of pension expenditure in 001 and 
00, in a less favourable macroeconomic context, is a first illustration of the materiality of this problem . 
It is even more important to ensure the long-term sustainability of the pension regime in these potentially 
volatile circumstances . 
The three factors mentioned above clearly underline the usefulness of long-term projections in Luxem-
bourg . The latter would indeed contribute to lift somewhat the veil of uncertainty, by providing clear 
quantitative outputs and some illustrations of the dynamics at play . At the same time, however, the very 
same factors make it more difficult to infer future developments . For instance, the magnitude as well as the 
age or gender composition of the future inflows of cross-border and foreign workers is extremely difficult 
to predict, as they may not be in line with past or contemporaneous developments . The contention that 
long-term scenarios have to be interpreted with caution is therefore even more justified in Luxembourg 
than in other countries .
1.2  Structure of the BCL pension model
The pension model is articulated as follows:
The demographic module 
The integration of a demographic module greatly enhances the coherence of the projection framework . It 
enables to calculate the incidence of alternative demographic scenarios in a flexible manner . In addition, 
the full-blown integration of a demographic module ensures that the connection with the major determi-
nants of revenue and expenditure is made in an adequate manner . The starting point of the demographic 
module is the structure of the Luxembourg resident population at the end of the base year, namely 004,6 
with a breakdown by age and gender . 
A mortality table is then applied in a sequential way, in order to calculate the number of residents and the 
future population structure . For instance, the number of women aged 55 in 005 is supposed equal to 
the number aged 54 in 004, multiplied by the appropriate mortality coefficient . The same procedure is 
applied for all age and gender categories, and the user of the model introduces the number of newborn 
individuals . The last step is the inclusion of the net inflows of immigrants . These inflows are also introduced 
in an exogenous way, with a breakdown by gender and age based on a matrix calculated by STATEC . This 
structure is kept unchanged throughout the projection horizon .
The whole procedure is replicated for 006 based on the population structure inferred for 005, and the 
process is continued until the last year of the projection horizon, namely 085, is reached . The demo-
graphic module has been tested for different assumptions . It yields results that are largely comparable to 
the STATEC demographic projections,7 at least when the exogenous variables (e .g . mortality, fertility and 
immigration) are identical .
Derivation of the insured, resident active population
The evolution of the insured resident population is essential for the calculation of pension revenue and 
expenditure . This population is close to the active population per se, but there are some differences . 
For instance, civil servants and assimilated employees, like the CFL staff, are not included in the insured 
6   This is the last year covered in the most recent IGSS annual report (2005).
   See for instance STATEC (2006).17
  population . The calculation of the insured population proceeds in two phases . In the first phase, a matrix 
of participation rates calculated based on IGSS (001 and 005) data is derived . For each age and gender 
category, the matrix consists in a breakdown by occupation, namely old age pensions, invalidity pensions, 
survival pensions, activity and all other statutes,8 where the corresponding proportions sum up to 1, by 
definition . The matrix cannot be changed for the base year 004 . However, it can be amended for the rest 
of the projection horizon . In particular, the proportions of pensioners can be adapted for each of the three 
pension categories (old age, invalidity, survival), and the same prevails for the proportion of active indi-
viduals . For each subsequent year, the matrixes are applied to the population structure derived in accord-
ance with the procedure described above . The end result is the evolution of the insured and active resident 
population, broken down by age and gender . The second step is a calibration exercise that ensures that 
this active population coincides with the insured population in the base year 004 . 
Projection of the wage bill and the pension contributions for the resident population
It is of the foremost importance to derive the evolution of revenue, since they constitute the basis for the 
calculation of pension contributions . The evolution of wages is estimated starting from the insured, active 
resident population calculated in the previous phase . All age and gender categories of the population are 
multiplied by the appropriate average wages . The age and gender specific wages are then adjusted in 
order to guarantee that the total wage bill calculated in the simulator is equal to the corresponding macro-
economic figure for residents . For all future years, the contribution base can be calculated in a straight-
forward way, by combining the matrix of average wages with the gender and age specific cohorts of the 
insured resident population . Average wages are of course adapted each year based on two exogenous 
variables, namely inflation and the change in real wages . For the years 005-007, these variables are 
aligned on the internal projections made by the BCL . For subsequent years the real wage is set in line with 
another exogenous variable, namely the rate of growth of labour productivity .
The total amount of pension contributions is by construction equal to the contribution base multiplied by 
the contribution rate, which is treated as an exogenous variable . The starting contribution rate observed in 
004 is equal to 4%, divided in an equal way among employers, employees and the State (8% each) .
Calculation of pension expenditure for the resident population
The calculation of pension expenditure pays respect to three different categories, namely old age, invalidity 
and survival pensions . This standard treatment, also applied by the ILO, which also carried out pension 
projections for Luxembourg in 000, ensures that the expenditure side is covered in an exhaustive manner . 
For each of these categories, the number of pensioners is first calculated based on the status matrixes 
already described above . This ensures an integrated, coherent treatment of the workforce participation 
rates on the one hand, and the proportion of pensioners by age and gender groups on the other hand . The 
latter proportions have been calculated for the base year 004, based on the gender and age structure 
of the resident population and the corresponding structure of the population of resident pensioners . The 
status matrixes are adjusted in order to take into account a gradual increase in the labour force participa-
tion rate of women, which would by assumption increase their proportion in the resident workforce from 
39% in 001 to 45% in 085 .
The number of pensioners in each category is then multiplied by the corresponding average pension, in 
order to infer the pension expenditure by age and gender groups . The starting average pensions are calcu-
lated for each of the groups based on data provided in ILO (000), updated on the basis of IGSS data .
8   For instance unemployed people or students.18
Inclusion of the “cross-border” segment of the active, insured population
As already indicated above, the inclusion of the cross-border insured workers is of an overriding importance 
in Luxembourg, where they represented about 37% of the workforce at the end of 004 . At the same 
time, the inclusion of this segment is challenging . The available statistical evidence is indeed somewhat 
misleading, because the behaviour of retired or soon-to-retire cross-border workers is a poor predictor of 
the future behaviour of present-day commuters . This is particularly the case as regards the average dura-
tion of the Luxembourg career of cross-border workers, which was quite low in the past . Because of this 
feature, the average pension is comparatively low . It could be misleading to assume that these patterns 
will replicate in the future . The ILO (000) and the IGSS (006) indeed departs from such a hypothesis, 
by assuming that cross-border workers will partially and gradually converge to the resident workers as 
regards the duration of their career and, accordingly, their average pension . The simulations provided in this 
paper rest on the similar assumption of a gradual and partial convergence that would take place between 
004 and 05 . The average pension to which cross-border workers would converge would still be lower 
than the similar pensions paid to residents, by 10% due to lower average wages .9 
The pension expenditure and revenue ascribable to cross-border workers are calculated in the same way 
as the corresponding aggregates for resident workers, according to the steps already reviewed above . 
Data specific to commuters are of course used at each stage . This is for instance the case for the demo-
graphic structure per age and per gender and for the average retirement date . The calculation of pension 
expenditure also pays respect to the current population of cross-border pensioners broken down by age 
and gender based on ILO (000) data updated on the basis of IGSS statistics . As is the case for resident 
workers, demographic variables can be adapted in an exogenous way . 
1.3  The baseline pension scenario and its sensitivity to flows of cross-border workers
A baseline pension scenario is first briefly described . It cannot be assimilated to a full-blown economic 
forecast . It should instead be considered as a benchmark, aimed at providing some guidance for the 
comparisons with alternative simulations . Due to the numerous uncertainties surrounding the estimation 
of especially cross-border workers in the future, the reference projection is complemented with a sensitivity 
analysis . 
The reference projection is based on a set of demographic and macro-economic assumptions described in 
a synthetic way in Table 1 . As regards macroeconomic variables, it should first be noted that real GDP 
is an exogenous variable in the baseline scenario . Given the fixed growth of labour productivity, which is 
held constant throughout the 008-085 horizon, employment must adjust in a flexible way . This is done 
using as an endogenous, “residual” variable the number of cross-border workers . In other words, the 
number of cross-border workers merely adjusts to the rate of GDP growth chosen in an exogenous way in 
order to ensure compatibility with productivity developments . By contrast, immigration flows have been set 
to 4,000 persons every year all over the projection period . The choice of the residual variable – namely the 
number of cross-border workers or alternatively immigration flows – does not impact in a significant way 
the projection results, because the age structure of these two categories of workers is quite similar . 
   Based on some evidence collected in STATEC (5 and 2005). 19
Table 1 – Key assumptions
Inflation and GDP 
growth (%)
Real wages (%) Labour productivity (%)
2004-2007 BCL December 2005 projections
2008-2085 1,9 and 3% 2,0 2,0
Birth rate Fertility kept constant at its 2004 level
Mortality In line with the ILO (2000) assumptions
Immigration 4,000 immigrants a year from 2008 to 2070
Cross-border 
workers
In line with GDP developments (residual variable)
Labour force 
participation rate
Increases in a gradual way for women, stable for men. Therefore, women 
would represent 45% of the labour force in 2085, compared to 39% in 
2004. The unemployment rate would be stable for residents.
The macroeconomic hypotheses are based on the autumn 005 macroeconomic forecasts carried out by 
the BCL over the 005-007 period . For the subsequent years, the inflation rate and the rate of growth of 
labour productivity have been set to 1 .9 and %, respectively . In order to ensure the stability of the ratio of 
the wage bill to GDP, the rate of growth of real wages has also been set equal to % . According to BCL 
calculations, the latter figure is in line with the average real growth rate of wages observed over the period 
1970-004, which reached 1 .7% per year .
Consistently with the “unchanged policy” assumption, the rate of pension contributions jointly paid 
by employees, employers and the State would remain constant throughout the projection period, at 4% 
of gross wages . 
As far as demographic changes are concerned, the two crucial variables are the number of births and 
of immigrants . The number of births has been calculated in order to ensure the stability of the fertility rate 
at the level observed in 004 all over the projection horizon . In spite of this assumption, a sharp increase 
in the number of births is observed due to a steep increase of the Luxembourg population, in particular the 
young to middle-aged women likely to have children . Immigration is a crucial factor behind this sustained 
population increase .  The mortality rates are in line with the ones used by ILO in its own projections, carried 
out in 000 .
Under this set of hypotheses, the Luxembourg population would increase from 457,000 in 004 to 540,000 
in 00, close to 700,000 in 050 and 880,000 in 085 . The latest figures have to be considered with 
reservation, however, as they postulate the continuation of past trends over a long period of time . In addi-
tion, the projections do not include potential saturation of public infrastructures or the housing capacity . 
Another important hypothesis presiding upon the baseline projection is an increase in the labour force 
participation rate of women . This evolution would take place in a gradual way over the projection 
horizon . As a result, the proportion of women in the insured, active resident population would go up 
from 39% in 001 to 45% in 085 . All other participation rates would be kept unchanged . Likewise, the 
proportion of retirees observed for each age category is kept constant throughout the projection horizon . 
It should also be noted that the average nominal yield on pension reserves is stuck at 4 .5% a 
year – under the assumption that the diversification strategy will remain quite subdued . The interest rate 
charged on liabilities is set equal to 4% a year .  0
The budgetary results associated with the baseline projection are synthesised in Chart 3 . All budgetary 
results and debt levels are confined to the private pension system . They therefore do not refer to the 
Luxembourg Central Government and to the other branches of the social security system . Although a 
precise comparison is difficult to carry out due to different underlying assumptions, on face value the budg-
etary outcomes are quite similar to the indicators projected in IGSS (006) over the 005-050 period . For 
instance, the liabilities of the private sector pension regime would reach 49% of GDP in 050 under the 
3% GDP growth scenario according to IGSS (006), compared to 39% in the BCL baseline scenario .
Chart 3 – Budgetary outcomes of the private pension regime under the baseline projection  
As percentages of GDP
1. Budgetary flows of the general pension regime
2. Net financial assets (+) or liabilities (-) of the general pension regime
Sources: IGSS, ILO, STATEC, BCL calculations .
As already explained in section 1 .1, the current situation of the Luxembourg private pension regime is very 
comfortable at first sight . Pension reserves represented 4% of GDP in 004 and this percentage would 
further increase to 35% in 00, as both the primary ratio and the overall balance would be in surplus over 
this period . The overall balance would be enhanced by significant interest revenues, which would reach 
1 .5% of GDP around 00 .
However, a negative inflection would already occur around 01, as the overall surplus would begin to 
decline due to the more sustained increase of pension expenditure . This increase would further accelerate 
thereafter, in particular from 00 to 050 .  Although this evolution would also be attributable to the 
retirement of resident employees, it would primarily reflect the retirement of large numbers of cross-border 1
workers that would echo the large inflows of commuters observed or assumed at the beginning of the 
projection period . By contrast to pension expenditure, total revenue would remain remarkably stable at 
about 10% of GDP throughout the projection period . This is the reflection of the assumed parallelism 
between the evolution of the tax base – i .e . basically real gross wages – and labour productivity, as both 
would increase by % a year from 008 onwards in a context where the contribution rate would also 
remain stable at 4% of gross wages . In addition, the evolution of the total workforce would affect the 
wage bill and GDP in a similar fashion, as GDP growth and the evolution of the number of employees are 
closely linked .
The dichotomy between the evolution of expenditure and revenue from around 01 onwards would 
imply a deteriorating primary balance, which would turn negative from 01 . The overall balance would 
remain in surplus for several more years owing to interest revenue, but it would also record a deficit from 
07 onwards . Net liabilities would appear from 039 and the debt ratio would further increase there-
after, to reach 39% of GDP in 050, more than 100% in 070 and about 160% at the end of the projec-
tion period .  
Pension projections are extremely sensitive to the number of cross-border workers . As illustrated in Chart 
4, which simulates the impact of 10,000 additional cross-border workers in 008 on budgetary flows 
all over the projection horizon, this impact persists for a very long time, which provides a justification for 
long projection horizons .10 The incidence on the primary balance is neutral at the end of the life cycle of 
the oldest commuters . After an initially positive impact related to higher social contributions, the primary 
balance turns negative due to the retirement of gradually larger contingents of cross-border workers . The 
incidence on the overall balance is less intuitive due to complex interest rate dynamics . It would be slightly 
negative over the long term, but this result should be interpreted with caution . 
Chart 4 – Impact on the primary and overall balances of the pension system of 10,000 
additional cross-border workers in 2008
Changes in the respective ratios to GDP
Sources: IGSS, ILO, STATEC, BCL calculations .
Since a high and constant rate of economic growth implies constantly growing inflows of cross-border 
workers, the neutral or even slightly negative long-term fiscal impacts identified in the longitudinal analysis 
of Chart 4 would not materialise in high growth conditions . In this case, the initial, positive phase induced 
0 It is in particular essential to take on board the large inflows of cross-border workers observed from 0 to 2005 all over their 
life cycle.
by higher contributions would indeed overshadow the negative phase in the aggregated figures . However, 
it would require a high rate of economic growth to achieve such a result all over the projection period . This 
phenomenon is illustrated in Chart 5 . At the current juncture, even a GDP growth rate of 4% a year would 
not be sufficient to palliate the “adverse tail” of the longitudinal curve . In addition, a 4% GDP growth rate 
would require considerable inflows of cross-border workers (second part of Chart 5) . These results under-
line the need to base sustainability assessment on a joint monitoring of financial and immigration/cross-
border developments in an open country like Luxembourg .
Chart 5 – Sustainability of the private pension regime under several GDP growth 
assumptions (1) 
As percentages of GDP
1. Evolution of pension reserves
2. Corresponding evolution of the number of cross-border workers
Sources: IGSS, ILO, STATEC, BCL calculations .
(1) All other assumptions are kept unchanged .
2  Presentation of the Modigliani/Muralidhar reform proposal
In their book “Rethinking Pension Reform”, Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) advocate a gradual transition 
from PAYG to a partially or fully funded pension system . Under their proposal, a new pension fund (labelled 
“New Fund” in the rest of this paper) would be set up . It would be a public entity but the underlying 
reserves could be managed by private sector financial intermediaries within the confines of ad hoc rules . 3
Most importantly, the New Fund would finance pensions based on “defined benefits” (and not “defined 
contributions”) . Pension benefits could be defined in the same way as under the current PAYG system 
and would be financed with the social contributions channelled to the NF and with the interest revenue 
stockpiled by the Fund on its own accumulated reserves . The contribution rate would be calibrated in order 
to guarantee that the pension system is balanced over the long-term, assuming a reference, target yield 
on reserves . The latter rate is of course conditional on the proportion of stocks and risk-free assets held 
in the NF portfolio . A central government transfer to the NF would offset the financing gaps that would 
occur in the short-term, when the achieved returns are lower than the targeted rate . The opposite transfer 
– from the NF to the Treasury – would take place when market yields exceed the targeted rate . These 
smoothing transfers would occur under the aegis of a formal swap agreement between the Treasury and 
the NF . According to simulations carried out by Modigliani and Muralidhar in the U .S . case, no significant 
transfers from the Treasury to the NF would have taken place in the 196-000 period, even with a target 
yield equal to 5% or more in real terms and in spite of the inclusion of the major stock market crisis that 
took place in 199 and at the beginning of the thirties . For more detailed explanations on the Modigliani/
Muralidhar solution, see in particular Chapter 5 of their book .
Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) argue that the transition cost would be minimised under their proposed 
solution and that it should normally lead to the conjunction of much lower contribution rates and comfort-
able reserves once the transition phase has been completed . The underlying mechanism at stake is illus-
trated in Table  and Chart 6, which have been set up in an hypothetical way in order to describe the 
working of a specific version of the model, namely the one with a quick transition process where NF 
contributions are set equal to their long-term equilibrium level from the beginning of the projection period . 
A range of more gradual alternatives is proposed in Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) – there is indeed 
a trade-off between speed of adjustment and intergenerational fairness that is addressed carefully by the 
authors . By the same token, a gradual transition process is presented in part 3 . below . All figures in the 
table are expressed as percentages of the contributory base – namely basically the wage bill before taxes 
and social contributions – over the 008-085 horizon . It is indeed assumed in a purely illustrative manner 
that the pension reform would become effective from January 008 . 4
Table 2 – Illustration of the Modigliani/Muralidhar proposal 
(yield on assets: 4.4% in real terms; macroeconomic and demographic assumptions in line 
with the baseline projection in Chapter 1)
























  1. 2. 3. =6.*7. 4.=1.+2.-3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.=1.+8. 10.=9.-7.
008 14 .4 0 .0 0 .0 14 .3 14 .3 0 . 0 .5 0 .5 34 .8 14 .3
009 14 .4 0 .9 0 .1 15 .1 8 .7 0 .6 0 .5 0 .4 34 .7 14 .
010 14 .4 1 .8 0 .3 15 .9 43 . 1 . 0 .5 0 . 34 .6 14 .1
011 14 .4  .6 0 .4 16 .6 57 .6  .1 0 .5 0 .1 34 .5 14 .0
01 14 .4 3 .5 0 .6 17 .3 7 .1 3 .1 0 .5 19 .9 34 . 13 .7
013 14 .4 4 .4 0 .9 17 .9 86 .5 4 .3 0 .5 19 .6 34 .0 13 .5
014 14 .4 5 .3 1 . 18 .5 100 .9 5 .7 0 .5 19 .3 33 .7 13 .
015 14 .4 6 . 1 .5 19 .1 115 .1 7 . 0 .5 19 .0 33 .4 1 .9
016 14 .4 7 .0 1 .8 19 .6 19 . 8 .9 0 .5 18 .7 33 .1 1 .6
017 14 .4 7 .9  . 0 .1 143 . 10 .7 0 .5 18 .3 3 .7 1 .
018 14 .4 8 .8  .6 0 .5 157 .0 1 .6 0 .5 17 .9 3 .3 11 .8
019 14 .4 9 .6 3 .0 1 .0 170 .6 14 .7 0 .5 17 .5 31 .9 11 .4
00 14 .4 10 .4 3 .5 1 .3 183 .9 17 .0 0 .5 17 .0 31 .4 10 .9
01 14 .4 11 .3 4 .0 1 .6 197 .0 19 .5 0 .5 16 .5 30 .9 10 .4
0 14 .4 1 .1 4 .5 1 .9 09 .6  .0 0 .5 16 .0 30 .4 9 .9
03 14 .4 1 .8 5 .0  .  .1 4 .6 0 .5 15 .5 9 .8 9 .3
04 14 .4 13 .6 5 .6  .4 34 . 7 . 0 .5 14 .9 9 .3 8 .8
05 14 .4 14 .3 6 .1  .6 46 .0 9 .9 0 .5 14 .4 8 .7 8 .
06 14 .4 15 .1 6 .7  .8 57 .4 3 .6 0 .5 13 .8 8 . 7 .7
07 14 .4 15 .8 7 .  .9 68 .4 35 . 0 .5 13 .3 7 .7 7 .
08 14 .4 16 .4 7 .7 3 .1 79 .1 37 .7 0 .5 1 .8 7 .1 6 .6
09 14 .4 17 .1 8 .3 3 . 89 .4 40 .3 0 .5 1 . 6 .6 6 .1
030 14 .4 17 .7 8 .8 3 .3 99 .3 4 .8 0 .5 11 .7 6 .1 5 .6
035 14 .4 0 .5 11 . 3 .6 34 .9 54 .8 0 .5 9 .3 3 .6 3 .1
040 14 .4  .6 13 .5 3 .5 376 .1 65 .9 0 .5 7 .0 1 .4 0 .9
045 14 .4 4 . 15 .6 3 .0 400 . 76 .1 0 .5 4 .9 19 .3 0 .0
050 14 .4 5 .3 17 .3  .4 417 .1 84 .3 0 .5 3 . 17 .6 0 .0
055 14 .4 6 .1 18 .6 1 .9 48 .3 90 .8 0 .5 1 .9 16 .3 0 .0
060 14 .4 6 .5 19 .5 1 .4 434 .8 95 . 0 .5 1 .0 15 .4 0 .0
065 14 .4 6 .8 0 .1 1 .1 437 .7 97 .8 0 .5 0 .4 14 .8 0 .0
070 14 .4 6 .8 0 .3 0 .9 439 .0 99 .0 0 .5 0 . 14 .6 0 .0
075 14 .4 6 .9 0 .4 0 .9 440 .0 99 .5 0 .5 0 .1 14 .5 0 .0
080 14 .4 6 .9 0 .4 0 .9 440 .6 99 .7 0 .5 0 .1 14 .4 0 .0
081 14 .4 7 .0 0 .4 0 .9 440 .7 99 .7 0 .5 0 .1 14 .4 0 .0
08 14 .4 7 .0 0 .5 0 .9 440 .8 99 .8 0 .5 0 .0 14 .4 0 .0
083 14 .4 7 .0 0 .5 0 .9 440 .8 99 .9 0 .5 0 .0 14 .4 0 .0
084 14 .4 7 .0 0 .5 0 .9 440 .8 99 .9 0 .5 0 .0 14 .4 0 .0
085 14 .4 7 .0 0 .5 0 .8 440 .8 100 .0 0 .5 0 .0 14 .4 0 .0
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . Based on Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) .5
Table  draws on the current situation of the Luxembourg private sector pension system, with two impor-
tant exceptions . First, the initial pension reserve (i .e . reserves as of 31 December 007) is set at zero . 
Second, it is assumed that the cost ratio, namely primary pension expenditure11 divided by the contribution 
base, will remain constant at the level projected by the BCL for 008 all over the projection horizon . The 
proportion of pensions transferred to the NF, which determines the speed of the transition, plays a crucial 
role, as explained below and in Annex 1 . By convention, pensions would be transferred to the NF on a pro 
rata basis, depending on the relative weight in the carrier of contributory incomes earned from January 
008 onwards – as the pension reform would by assumption be implemented in 008 . This means that for 
a 40-year career, the future pension benefits of employees who joined the insured population in December 
1990 would be split between the PAYG system and the NF regime . A share of pension benefits equal to 
4 .5% (i .e . 17/40) would remain under the PAYG system and would therefore appear in column 8 . of Table 
, whereas the rest (i .e . 3/40) would be paid by the NF and be included in the amount mentioned in 
column 3 . of the same table . It should be noted that the splitting coefficient would not make any difference 
at the individual level . The NF would indeed operate under the defined-benefit principle . Pensions would 
be calculated with the PAYG pension formula, exactly in the same way as under the currently prevailing 
system and with the very same wage replacement ratio . For the record, net pensions are equal to 109,8% 
of gross wages in Luxembourg according to the OECD (005), at least when a full career is considered . 
The transition rates used in Table  (column 6 .) are calculated in the same way but on an aggregated 
basis and taking into account for instance the length of careers and the age structure for each gender 
and pension category (i .e . old age pensions, disability, survival pensions), for residents as well as for cross-
border workers, as explained in Annex 1 .  The proportion of transferred pensions – namely the speed of the 
transition process – tends to increase with the number of cross-border workers, because their career is on 
average shorter than the career of resident employees, as already mentioned in Chapter 1 . The most promi-
nent implication is that the speed of transition tends to increase with economic growth in Luxembourg .
As shown in Table  and Chart 6, the payment of pensions would be gradually transferred to the NF, 
as illustrated by the increasing amount in column 3 . and the concomitant and commensurate decrease 
in column 8 . The transition process would be completed only at the very end of the projection period . 
Employees who became affiliated to pension insurance in January 007 and who will retire in December 
046 – thus after a 40-year carrier – will indeed still earn part of their pension benefits under the aegis 
of the PAYG system under the above-mentioned convention (this will be the case for 1/40 or  .5% of the 
total pension benefits of these employees) . Since some of them could collect pension benefits for 30 years 
or even more, the transition period may conceivably last until after 075 . In practice, however, the transi-
tion would basically have elapsed around 065 under the scenario illustrated in Table  . 
The first step of the calibration of the funding process is the choice of the reference real yield on reserves . 
As illustrated in section 3 .4 devoted to the sensitivity analysis, this choice is of paramount importance . 
The funding projections presented in Table  and Chart 6  were made on the assumption that the NF will 
diversify its reserves, by investing 35% in stocks and the rest in risk-free assets . Based on realistic assump-
tion about the equity risk premium and the average real risk-free interest rate, the benchmark rate of real 
return used throughout the projection period is set equal to 4 .4% . The rationale that presided over this 
calculation is further described in Annex  . Two remarks are worth mentioning at this stage, however . First, 
the relevant yield is the pre-tax rate because the NF would be a public entity . It is assumed in the projec-
tions that it would be exempted from taxes on property incomes . Alternatively, the NF may have to pay 
these taxes that would therefore flow to the central government, but the central government would then 
transfer the corresponding additional revenue to the NF .
 Including administrative costs.6
Second, the benchmark yield could appear overestimated at first sight, in particular with respect to the 
implicit yield on pension reserves observed in Luxembourg at the end of 004 .1 This reflects the benefits of 
diversification out of short-term assets . In addition, the benchmark 4 .4% rate presupposes an equity risk 
premium below the level considered as reasonable – in the U .S . case – by Modigliani and Muralidhar . This is 
the reason why the benchmark rate is quite conservative with respect to the reference rates of return adopted 
by the authors, which are in the range 5-5 .5% in real, pre-tax terms . Finally, the benchmark rate would be in 
line with the average yield achieved by the Government Pension Fund in Norway (see Annex ) .
Chart 6 – Illustration of the Modigliani/Muralidhar proposal
As a percentage of gross contributory incomes, unless stated otherwise
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . Based on Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) .
2 See IGSS (2005).7
In order to ensure a higher return on the investment of the reserves of the public pension system, a new 
investment strategy was devised in 003 . It was described in the 5th update of the Luxembourg Stability 
Programme, presented in November 003 . This strategy foresees that private sector pension reserves 
could be invested in a range of instruments in order to improve returns . The portfolio will be managed 
by a mutual investment fund overseen by the Minister in charge of social security . Provided that it is fully 
enforced, this strategy would ease the transition to funding .
The next step of the funding projections is the calculation of the social contribution that would be chan-
nelled to the NF (see column 1 . of Table ) . This constant rate is chosen in order to guarantee that the fund 
is fully balanced in the short-term and that sustainability is guaranteed after the transition process has 
elapsed . As illustrated in Table  and Chart 6, a contribution rate equal to 14,4% of contributory incomes 
all over the projection horizon would ensure the advent of a stable steady state situation, characterised 
by a constant reserve ratio when the transition is completed and by a NF balance which is also fully stable 
with respect to contributory incomes and GDP . In such a situation, reserves would be large enough to 
produce a stream of property income sufficient to finance the gap between the cost ratio and the long-
term contribution rate and to ensure long-term sustainability, as explained in the analytical Annex 4 . Total 
reserves would accumulate especially at the beginning of the transition period, because the pensions paid 
by the NF would still be well below the contributions channelled to the fund . The NF budgetary surplus 
(including property incomes) would amount to 14% of gross incomes in 008 and would further increase 
thereafter, as property incomes would grow in line with the accumulation of reserves . NF reserves would 
stabilise at 441% of incomes at the end of the projection period (i .e . 175% of GDP) in the scenario envis-
aged in Table , provided that the cost ratio remains constant throughout the projection horizon . It is inter-
esting to note that the 441% ratio does not only satisfy these stabilising properties . It is also fully compliant 
with the present value budget constraint, since it coincides with the present value of the primary balance 
of the NF over an infinite time horizon, assuming that the primary deficit remains equal to the level reached 
at the end of the projection period, namely 0 .5% (the cost ratio) minus 14 .4% (the constant contribution 
rate) over this infinite horizon .13 The equivalence between the steady state equilibrium and the present 
value budget constraint is demonstrated in Annex 4 . This is a crucial property, because it ensures that the 
transition to funding illustrated in Table  is fully consistent with long-term sustainability and the actuarial 
equilibrium of the pension system . NF contribution rates lower than 14 .4% would necessarily lead to 
deteriorating budgetary ratios at the end of the projection period and the present value budget constraint 
would be breached, unless the total required financing is intensified at the beginning of the projection 
period . 
The overall balance14 consistent with the steady state equilibrium would reach 1% of gross incomes (see 
equations (6) and (7) in Annex 4 for an analytical calculation of this consistent balance) . This may appear 
quite substantial, but such a high level is required in order to stabilise the asset ratio under the scenario 
envisaged in Table  . The annual growth rate of gross nominal income is indeed equal to about 5% (i .e . 
real growth of 3% and inflation rate of 1 .9%) in this scenario (see the baseline projection in Chapter I) . 
The denominator of the asset ratio therefore increases by 5% each year, thus the need for a commen-
surate overall surplus in order to offset this “asset dilution” phenomenon . Most interestingly, the latter 
phenomenon contributes to dampen the impact on the funded pension system of GDP growth inflexions, 
as explained in section 3 .3 below . 
 Should the cost ratio prove non-stable after the projection horizon, this problem could be addressed through innovative means 
such as the one described in Modigliani and Muralidhar, in Chapter 8 (“The Case for Mixed Systems and Variable Contributions: 
Improving the Peformance of Pension Systems”).
 The overall balance is the primary balance plus property incomes.8
The equilibrium constant contribution rate of 14 .4% achieved in the long term is well below the current 
4% contribution rate, owing to the prefunding inherent in the Modigliani/Muralidhar proposal . The so-
called “transition cost” (see column 10 . of Table ) would indeed give way to significantly positive NF 
budgetary balances and to the correlative accumulation of reserves, which would be further magnified by 
comfortable property incomes . Thanks to prefunding, property incomes would represent no less than 7% 
of gross incomes from 060 onwards in the hypothetical case presented in Table  . This large amount 
would cover the overall balance needed in order to offset the “reserve dilution effect” – namely 1% of 
gross incomes – on the one hand and the difference between the cost ratio and the equilibrium contribu-
tion rate (i .e . 0 .5-14 .4%=6 .1%) on the other hand . Although considerable, the decrease in contribution 
rate would be of a lesser magnitude than the gain identified by Modigliani and Muralidhar in Chapter 5 
of “Rethinking Pension Reform” . This reflects the quicker transition to funding in Table , which is mostly 
attributable to the short career of cross-border workers .15 The initial accumulation of assets is therefore 
less pronounced than in the Modigliani/Muralidhar simulations centred on the U .S . case . In addition, as 
mentioned above, the benchmark real yield rate used in this paper is more conservative than the one 
assumed by Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) . Finally, the initial simulation carried out by the authors is 
made for a hypothetical stationary economy, where economic growth – and therefore the reserve dilution 
effect – is nonexistent . 
The prefunding inherent in the Modigliani/Muralidhar proposal is best illustrated in column 9 . of Table , 
where the total required financing is singled out . The required financing is equal to the constant contribu-
tion rate channelled to the NF plus the remaining cost of the PAYG system .16 Since the latter system is by 
assumption phased out in a gradual way, this remaining cost will gradually disappear, as shown in column 
8 . of the Table, and the required financing will therefore narrow down to the fixed contribution to the NF 
in the medium-term . The transition cost, which is equal to the difference between the required financing 
and the cost ratio,17 would be close to the contribution rate at the beginning of the transition process, but 
would then erode away . It would be fully neutralised from 04 onwards in the hypothetical simulation 
presented in Table  and Chart 6, namely well before the completion of the transition period (the cost of 
PAYG pensions would indeed still amount to 6% of gross incomes in 04) . The transition costs would 
vanish within a relatively short time horizon owing to the virtuous asset and property income dynamic .  
The transition to funding outlined below in the case of a constant cost ratio appears extremely successful 
in the long-term, as it would give way to large and stable assets and budgetary surpluses in spite of a 
low steady state contribution rate . This very favourable situation would reflect the prefunding inherent in 
the transition process . However, the magnitude of the prefunding effort is such that the required financing 
would be close to 35% of gross incomes at the beginning of the transition period . This would exceed the 
current contribution rates by 11% or 4 .3% of GDP . This prefunding burden and its impact on contributions 
could be alleviated owing to a wider range of financing channels that could extend for instance to higher 
central government transfers18 or alternative levies, but on the whole such a burden appears too large . 
Another shortcoming of the hypothetical simulation conducted in Table  and Chart 6 is the assumption of 
a constant cost ratio and of zero initial reserves, which is extremely unrealistic in the present Luxembourg 
context . These flaws will be addressed in Chapter 3 . of the paper . 
5 It is assumed in the projection that the length of their career will gradually converge to the one observed for resident workers. 
However, this assumption does not change significantly the speed of the transition due to the gradual implementation of this 
career convergence assumption.
6 Namely the aggregated amount of pensions that have not yet been transferred to the NF.
 The transition cost would appear even more limited if it were calculated with respect to the current contribution rate, namely 
2% of gross incomes.
8 Such a move was mentioned by the IMF in the concluding statements of its January 2006 Article IV mission to Luxembourg (see 
IMF (2006)).9
3  Application to Luxembourg
Although it already drew on some characteristics of the Luxembourg situation, the simulation conducted 
in the previous chapter was purely illustrative, as it was carried out in order to highlight the peculiarities of 
the Modigliani/Muralidhar proposal . In order to make it more relevant in the current Luxembourg context, 
its major shortcomings are successively addressed . An increasing cost ratio in line with the BCL pension 
projections and non-zero initial reserves are first put into the picture (section 3 .1) . Since this “solution” is still 
characterised by an unrealistically high prefunding burden, an alternative transition path with lower initial 
transfers to the NF and a less systematic link between pensions and real wage developments as is currently 
the case in Luxembourg is presented in section 3 . . This simulation is considered as the “baseline funding 
scenario” in the rest of the paper . A very interesting property of this new baseline projection – namely 
the fact that the budgetary situation of the private sector pension regime becomes much less vulnerable 
to GDP growth developments than under the current system – is highlighted in section 3 .3 . The baseline 
scenario is submitted to the “acid test” of sensitivity analyses in section 3 .4 .
3.1  Inclusion of initial assets and an increasing cost ratio
The funding projection presented in Table 3 departs from the illustrative simulation made in Table  in 
two respects, as explained above . First, an initial reserve is introduced into the picture . This reserve is equal 
to the total assets of the general pension regime, as projected in the BCL model for the end of 007 . 
By assumption, the reserves would be transferred to the NF in full on 31 December 007 . Second, the 
hypothesis of a constant cost ratio is dropped . The cost ratio presented in Table 3 is projected using the 
BCL baseline projection outlined in Chapter 1 . This new assumption about the cost ratio will give way to 
a higher equilibrium contribution rate . However, the inclusion of significant initial reserves will have the 
opposite effect . 
Table 3 makes it clear that the former, negative effect will strongly outweigh the latter impact . The cost 
ratio would increase from 0 .5% of gross incomes to 36 .4% at the end of the projection period . In this 
context, the steady state contribution rate would have to be set to 3 .%, which would exceed by a 
wide margin the contribution rate required under the constant cost ratio scenario (see Table ) . Although 
pension reserves would represent about 65% of gross incomes at the end of 007, this would hardly 
compensate the impact of the continuously increasing cost ratio . In spite of their high magnitude in 
absolute terms, the “compensation reserves” accumulated within the current pension framework would 
be clearly insufficient to address the prospective increase in pension benefits, which illustrates the need 
for much more demanding targets . The twin criteria of stable budgetary indicators and compliance with 
the present value budget constraint19 at the end of the projection horizon would require extremely high 
reserve and balance ratios . It is only in such a case that the stream of property incomes could cover the 
high cost ratios observed at the end of the projection horizon and would ensure at the same time a 
relatively moderate steady state contribution rates . The latter would indeed be below the current 4% 
contribution rate . Scenarios with less demanding target ratios would not satisfy the present value budget 
constraint and would lead to decreasing balance and reserve ratios at the end of the projection horizon, 
unless prefunding is further enhanced .
 Compliance with the present value budget constraint over an infinite horizon after 2085, where the cost ratio is assumed to re-
main constant at 6.% and the discount rate is equal to 6.%, namely the assumed nominal rate of return on pension reserves. 
It is further assumed that gross incomes would grow by about 5% a year in real terms (% in real terms plus .% inflation). This 
rule gives way to a steady state contribution rate equal to the rate that would stabilise the debt and balance ratios at the end of 
the projection horizon, as explained in Annex .30
Table 3 – Application to the Luxembourg situation: inclusion of initial assets and an 
increasing cost ratio (yield on assets: 4.4% in real terms)
























  1. 2. 3. =6.*7. 4.=1.+2.-3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.=1.+8. 10.=9.-7.
008 3 . 4 .0 0 .0 7 . 90 . 0 . 0 .5 0 .5 43 .6 3 .1
009 3 . 5 .5 0 .1 8 .5 114 .1 0 .6 0 .7 0 .6 43 .8 3 .0
010 3 . 7 .0 0 .3 9 .9 138 .3 1 . 0 .6 0 .3 43 .5  .9
011 3 . 8 .4 0 .4 31 . 16 .6  .1 1 . 0 .7 43 .9  .7
01 3 . 9 .9 0 .6 3 .4 187 . 3 .1 1 .0 0 .4 43 .6  .5
013 3 . 11 .4 0 .9 33 .7 11 .8 4 .3 1 .7 0 .8 43 .9  .
014 3 . 1 .9 1 . 34 .9 36 .5 5 .7 1 .6 0 .3 43 .5 1 .9
015 3 . 14 .5 1 .6 36 .0 61 . 7 .  .3 0 .7 43 .8 1 .6
016 3 . 16 .0  .0 37 . 86 .0 8 .9  .1 0 . 43 .3 1 .
017 3 . 17 .5  .4 38 . 310 .6 10 .7  .9 0 .4 43 .6 0 .7
018 3 . 19 .0  .9 39 .3 335 .3 1 .6  .8 19 .9 43 .1 0 .3
019 3 . 0 .5 3 .5 40 . 359 .7 14 .7 3 .6 0 .1 43 .3 19 .7
00 3 .  .0 4 .0 41 . 384 .0 17 .0 3 .6 19 .6 4 .7 19 .1
01 3 . 3 .5 4 .8 41 .9 408 .0 19 .5 4 .5 19 .7 4 .9 18 .4
0 3 . 5 .0 5 .4 4 .7 431 .6  .0 4 .5 19 .1 4 . 17 .8
03 3 . 6 .4 6 . 43 .3 454 .9 4 .6 5 .4 19 . 4 .3 16 .9
04 3 . 7 .9 6 .9 44 .1 478 .0 7 . 5 .5 18 .5 41 .7 16 .
05 3 . 9 .3 7 .9 44 .5 500 .5 9 .9 6 .6 18 .6 41 .8 15 .
06 3 . 30 .6 8 .7 45 .1 5 .4 3 .6 6 .6 17 .9 41 .1 14 .5
07 3 . 3 .0 9 .7 45 .4 543 .6 35 . 7 .7 17 .9 41 .1 13 .4
08 3 . 33 .3 10 .5 46 .0 564 .6 37 .7 7 .7 17 .3 40 .4 1 .7
09 3 . 34 .6 11 .6 46 .1 584 .6 40 .3 8 .8 17 . 40 .4 11 .6
030 3 . 35 .8 1 .3 46 .6 604 .1 4 .8 8 .8 16 .4 39 .6 10 .8
035 3 . 41 .3 17 . 47 . 690 . 54 .8 31 .4 14 . 37 .3 5 .9
040 3 . 45 .5 1 . 47 .6 757 .0 65 .9 3 .1 10 .9 34 .1  .0
045 3 . 48 .8 5 .4 46 .6 806 .8 76 .1 33 .4 8 .0 31 . 0 .0
050 3 . 51 . 8 .0 46 .4 844 .4 84 .3 33 . 5 . 8 .4 0 .0
055 3 . 53 .1 31 .0 45 . 871 .6 90 .8 34 . 3 . 6 .3 0 .0
060 3 . 54 .3 3 . 45 . 890 .6 95 . 33 .8 1 .6 4 .8 0 .0
065 3 . 55 .1 34 .0 44 .3 90 .4 97 .8 34 .7 0 .8 3 .9 0 .0
070 3 . 55 .6 34 .0 44 .8 911 . 99 .0 34 .4 0 .3 3 .5 0 .0
075 3 . 56 .1 35 .3 43 .9 917 .3 99 .5 35 .5 0 . 3 .3 0 .0
080 3 . 56 .3 35 . 44 .3 91 . 99 .7 35 .3 0 .1 3 .3 0 .0
081 3 . 56 .3 35 .9 43 .6 91 . 99 .7 36 .0 0 .1 3 .3 0 .0
08 3 . 56 .4 35 .4 44 . 91 .9 99 .8 35 .4 0 .1 3 . 0 .0
083 3 . 56 .4 36 . 43 .4 91 .8 99 .9 36 . 0 .1 3 . 0 .0
084 3 . 56 .4 35 .6 44 .0 9 . 99 .9 35 .6 0 .0 3 . 0 .0
085 3 . 56 .4 36 .4 43 . 91 .9 100 .0 36 .4 0 .0 3 . 0 .0
 Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . Based on Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) .31
Although the scenario would address the sustainability problem in a structural way, the short-term cost 
of such a solution appears unbearable . The required financing, namely the sum of the 3 .3% steady state 
contribution to the NF on the one hand and the cost of the remaining PAYG pensions on the other hand, 
would indeed reach about 44% of gross incomes at the beginning of the projection horizon .  This would 
imply additional resources equal to about 0% of gross wages (i .e . 44% minus the current contribution 
rate of 4%) or 8% of GDP . Such a massive transfer is off course out of reach of the Luxembourg authori-
ties . A tentative solution to this transition problem is assessed in the following section .
3.2  New baseline with contribution smoothing and suspension of the adjustments of 
pensions to real wages from 2007 to 2017
As explained by Modigliani and Muralidhar (004), several transition paths to the funding equilibrium could 
be envisaged . The simulation illustrated in Chart 7 presupposes that a cap on the total required financing 
is imposed during the transition period . The initial transfers to the NF would be below the steady state 
contribution rate in order to contain the transition cost . The transfer would converge to the level compat-
ible with the steady state contribution rate in a gradual manner, according to a pre-specified schedule . 
Provided that this schedule is strictly complied with, the NF would never be in an unbalanced position, 
because its pension expenditure would be of a low magnitude at the beginning of the transition process . 
A delicate balance should be struck when choosing the cap on the required financing and the correla-
tive initial transfers to the NF .0 On the one hand, a tight cap ensures that the transition cost is limited and 
realistic from a political perspective . On the other hand, too tight a cap would hamper or even derail the 
convergence process to the steady state equilibrium, as it could neutralise the virtuous reserve increasing 
process highlighted in Tables  and 3 above . By assumption, the total required financing is caped at 7% 
of gross incomes in the projection presented in Chart 7 . 
20 The initial transfers would be equal to the cap minus the cost ratio plus the NF pension expenditure.3
Chart 7 – Application to the Luxembourg situation with a 27% financing cap 
(yield on assets: 4.4% in real terms)
As a percentage of gross contributory incomes, unless stated otherwise
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . Based on Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) .
In addition, the transition to 7% would by convention be gradual at the very beginning of the transi-
tion period . The total resources channelled to the pension system as a whole (NF and remaining PAYG 
pensions) would be set to 6% in 008, 6 .3% in 009, 6 .5% in 010 and 6 .7% in 011 . Such a step 
forward in the collection of resources would not be over-demanding . The required adjustment over the first 
five years of the transition period would not exceed 1 .% of GDP, i .e . about the additional transfer from 
the central government to the pension system mentioned in the concluding statement of the January 006 
IMF Article IV mission to Luxembourg . Moreover, this additional amount would be collected in a gradual 33
way from 008 to 011 as indicated above . Finally, the additional resources could also be collected 
through higher contribution rates from employees and/or employers – with appropriate moves in order to 
avoid the adverse impact of  this measure on competitiveness – or via new, alternative financing resources . 
The arbitrage between these different levers is beyond the scope of this paper .
As illustrated in the first panel of Chart 7, the contribution rate that would flow to the NF would be limited 
at the beginning of the period, as it would by design no longer exceed 7% of gross wages (or even less 
from 008 to 011) minus the remaining cost of the PAYG pillar . Due to its low initial pension burden, the 
NF would still record surpluses at the beginning of the projection horizon, which would give way to the 
building up of significant assets from 008 to 030 . However, the resulting property income and NF overall 
surpluses would not be significant enough to offset the “reserve dilution” effect . The reserve-to-gross 
income ratio would therefore decline from 030 onwards . This would set in motion a downward spiral, 
where lower reserves would give way to declining property incomes and deteriorating balances, which 
would in turn further magnify the decrease in the asset ratio in the face of ever increasing pension expendi-
ture . At the end of the projection period, the NF would be in an unsustainable situation, characterised by 
significant and increasing deficits and by substantial liabilities . 
At first sight, Luxembourg would therefore not be in a position to reap the substantial gains associated 
with the funding strategy highlighted in the previous simulations, due to the steeply increasing cost ratio . 
However, the scenario presented in Chart 7 is conditional on an “unchanged policy assumption”, whereby 
accrued and future pension benefits would continue to be adjusted in full to real wage developments 
throughout the projection horizon .1 An alternative simulation presented in Table 4 below rests on a 
different hypothesis . It is assumed that the adjustment to real wages would be suspended from 007 
to 017, meaning that six adjustments would not take place (007, 009, 011, 013, 015 and 017) . 
Such a move would fully preserve the purchasing power of pensioners, which would remain stuck at its 
005 level until 017 . As real wages would by assumption increase by % a year from 008 onwards 
– and less before this date, in line with the BCL December 005 macroeconomic projections – the wage 
replacement ratio would decline by 18%, however . According to the OECD (005),  the wage replacement 
ratio calculated as a percentage of net incomes for a full career would have reached 109,8% in Luxem-
bourg in 003 . In spite of the above-mentioned delinking, the replacement ratio would therefore still be 
very comfortable from 017 to the end of the projection horizon, as it would reach 90% of net incomes 
earned prior to retirement . Ceteris paribus, this ratio would still exceed to a large extent the corresponding 
figures observed in the neighbouring countries – namely 7% in Germany, 69% in France and 63% in 
Belgium according to the OECD . The suspension measure included in Table 4 serves an illustrative purpose . 
Suspension of wage indexation could conceivably be introduced in a more gradual way and could be 
confined to specific categories (for instance pensions above a given threshold) . However, a more gradual 
suspension would have to be spread over a longer period and would be more costly in the medium-term, 
as delayed adjustments have adverse consequences on property incomes . Alternative measures could 
also be adopted, for instance changes in the pension formula or a partial delinking of pensions from price 
developments .
Table 4 makes it clear that the suspended indexation to real wages would enable Luxembourg to reap the 
benefits of funding, which means that the long-term budgetary impact of the measure would extend far 
beyond the direct cost savings involved . The required steady state contribution to the NF would be equal 
to 4% of gross incomes, namely the current contribution rate . This result would be achieved in spite of 
the growing cost ratio, owing to the significant property incomes brought about by funding . The total 
required financing would remain at the 7% mark until about 055, but it would then gradually converge 
2 This adjustment takes place every two years, hence the indented evolution of the cost ratio in Chart 2.34
to the steady state 4% rate . Prefunding is embedded in the scenario depicted in Table 3 in two manners . 
First, total primary revenue (i .e . contributions channelled to the NF and the revenue that would cover the 
remaining cost of the PAYG system) would be equal or close to 7% of gross incomes during most of 
the projection horizon, which would be in excess of the current contribution rate and well above the cost 
ratio . Second, the suspension of indexation to real wages would decrease the cost ratio recorded in 017 
by about 4% of gross wages – namely 1 .5% of GDP – compared to the “spontaneous” evolution of the 
ratio . In this context, reserves would increase steeply and converge to about 415% of gross incomes at 
the end of the projection horizon . As was the case in the previous scenarios, this asset ratio would ensure 
the stability of reserve and balance ratios at the end of the projection horizon . At the same time, it would 
guarantee that the present value budget constraint is fulfilled . The equilibrium asset ratio would of course 
be lower in case a partially funded solution is adopted rather than full funding, but such a solution would 
also require higher equilibrium contributions .
A reserve level equal to 415% of gross incomes would represent 165% of GDP . This may seems over-
demanding at first sight, but such a level would certainly not be unprecedented . In Norway, the total 
assets of the Government Pension Fund amounted to 78% of GDP at the end of 005, and this ratio is 
on a steeply ascending trend .3 In the Netherlands, the total assets of the civil servant pension fund ABP, 
which are calculated in an actuarial way in order to guarantee the payment of future pensions, reached 
36% of GDP on 31 December 004 .4 However, the coverage of the ABP in the Netherlands is well below 
the coverage of the private sector pension regime in Luxembourg . Should the coverage rate of the ABP be 
brought in line with the corresponding figure in Luxembourg, the assets of ABP would ceteris paribus have 
to swell to more than 150% of GDP in order to preserve the actuarial equilibrium . A prefunding strategy 
leading to the accumulation of large pension reserves is also recommended in OECD (006) .
Furthermore, Luxembourg is a small and very open economy vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks, which 
requires larger “shock absorber” – i .e . more substantial reserves – than is the case in larger countries . The 
large NF surplus that would be recorded during most of the projection horizon – namely about 0% of 
gross incomes or 8% of GDP – would further alleviate the impact of adverse developments . For instance, 
the 8% of GDP surplus would make it much easier for Luxembourg to avoid breaching the 3% deficit 
reference value embedded in one of the protocols of the Treaty Establishing the European Community .5 
According to the ESA 95 rules, the NF would indeed be included in general government .6 The surplus of 
the fund would therefore be taken into account in the calculation of ESA 95 balances . This wider room for 
manoeuvre would allow Luxembourg to address potential adverse shocks in a more flexible way, without 
incurring the risk of breaching the 3% reference value .
22 Assuming that the pension cost ratio will be stable at its 2085 level over an infinite horizon.
2 Government Pension Fund (2005). The total asset of the Fund at market value represented 5% of GDP at the end of 200.
2 ABP (200).
25 The overall surplus would be below 8% in the ESA 5 system of accounts, however, because capital gains on equity, either 
realised or not, are not considered as non-financial revenue in ESA 5.
26 Following a decision taken by Eurostat in March 200, defined-benefits pension funds have to be included in the general 
  government figures, irrespective of their public or private status. By contrast, defined-contribution funded pension schemes cannot 
be classified as social security schemes and are therefore classified outside of the government sector, even if the government is 
involved as a manager of the flow of contributions and pension benefits or as a guarantor for the risk of defaulting payments of 
pensions.35
Table 4 – Application to the Luxembourg situation: baseline funding scenario with suspen-
sion of real wage indexation from 2007 to 2017 (yield on assets: 4.4% in real terms)
























  1. 2. 3. =6.*7. 4.=1.+2.-3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.=1.+8. 10.=9.-7.
008 5 .8 4 .1 0 .0 9 .8 73 .1 0 . 0 . 0 . 6 .0 5 .8
009 6 .4 4 .5 0 .1 10 .7 80 .1 0 .6 0 .0 19 .9 6 .3 6 .3
010 6 .9 4 .9 0 . 11 .5 87 .6 1 . 19 .9 19 .6 6 .5 6 .6
011 7 .4 5 .3 0 .4 1 .3 95 .6  .1 19 .7 19 .3 6 .7 7 .0
01 8 .0 5 .8 0 .6 13 . 104 . 3 .1 19 .6 19 .0 7 .0 7 .4
013 8 .3 6 .4 0 .8 13 .9 113 .0 4 .3 19 .5 18 .6 7 .0 7 .5
014 8 .7 6 .9 1 .1 14 .5 1 .1 5 .7 19 .4 18 .3 7 .0 7 .6
015 9 .1 7 .5 1 .4 15 . 131 .5 7 . 19 .3 17 .9 7 .0 7 .7
016 9 .6 8 .0 1 .7 15 .9 141 .1 8 .9 19 . 17 .5 7 .0 7 .9
017 9 .9 8 .6  .0 16 .5 151 .0 10 .7 19 .1 17 .0 7 .0 7 .9
018 10 .4 9 .  .4 17 . 161 .1 1 .6 19 .0 16 .6 7 .0 8 .0
019 10 . 9 .9  .9 17 . 170 .6 14 .7 19 .7 16 .8 7 .0 7 .3
00 10 .7 10 .4 3 .3 17 .8 180 .4 17 .0 19 .6 16 .3 7 .0 7 .4
01 10 .6 11 .0 4 .0 17 .7 189 .7 19 .5 0 .4 16 .4 7 .0 6 .6
0 11 .1 11 .6 4 .5 18 . 199 .0  .0 0 .4 15 .9 7 .0 6 .6
03 11 .0 1 . 5 . 18 .0 07 .8 4 .6 1 . 16 .0 7 .0 5 .8
04 11 .6 1 .7 5 .8 18 .5 16 .7 7 . 1 . 15 .4 7 .0 5 .8
05 11 .5 13 .3 6 .6 18 . 4 .9 9 .9  .1 15 .5 7 .0 4 .9
06 1 .1 13 .8 7 . 18 .6 33 .1 3 .6  . 14 .9 7 .0 4 .8
07 1 .1 14 .3 8 .1 18 . 40 .6 35 . 3 .0 14 .9 7 .0 4 .0
08 1 .6 14 .7 8 .7 18 .7 48 .1 37 .7 3 .1 14 .4 7 .0 3 .9
09 1 .7 15 . 9 .6 18 . 54 .9 40 .3 3 .9 14 .3 7 .0 3 .0
030 13 .3 15 .6 10 . 18 .7 61 .8 4 .8 3 .9 13 .7 7 .0 3 .1
035 15 . 17 .5 14 .3 18 .4 90 .5 54 .8 6 .1 11 .8 7 .0 0 .9
040 18 .0 18 .9 17 .6 19 .3 313 .7 65 .9 6 .6 9 .1 7 .0 0 .4
045 0 .4 0 . 1 .0 19 .6 334 .3 76 .1 7 .7 6 .6 7 .0 0 .0
050  .7 1 .5 3 . 1 .0 355 .1 84 .3 7 .5 4 .3 7 .0 0 .0
055 4 .0  .8 5 .7 1 .0 375 .4 90 .8 8 .3  .6 6 .6 0 .0
060 4 .0 3 .7 6 .6 1 .1 390 .7 95 . 8 .0 1 .3 5 .3 0 .0
065 4 .0 4 .4 8 .1 0 .3 400 .3 97 .8 8 .7 0 .6 4 .6 0 .0
070 4 .0 4 .8 8 . 0 .6 407 .5 99 .0 8 .4 0 .3 4 . 0 .0
075 4 .0 5 . 9 . 19 .9 41 . 99 .5 9 .4 0 . 4 .1 0 .0
080 4 .0 5 .4 9 .1 0 . 415 .3 99 .7 9 . 0 .1 4 .1 0 .0
081 4 .0 5 .4 9 .7 19 .6 415 .3 99 .7 9 .8 0 .1 4 .0 0 .0
08 4 .0 5 .4 9 . 0 .1 415 .8 99 .8 9 .3 0 .1 4 .0 0 .0
083 4 .0 5 .4 9 .9 19 .5 415 .7 99 .9 9 .9 0 .0 4 .0 0 .0
084 4 .0 5 .4 9 .4 0 .0 416 .0 99 .9 9 .4 0 .0 4 .0 0 .0
085 4 .0 5 .4 30 .1 19 .4 415 .7 100 .0 30 .1 0 .0 4 .0 0 .0
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . Based on Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) .
The funding strategy illustrated in Table 4 – henceforth referred to as the “baseline funding scenario” – could 
conceivably me mimicked within the current pension framework, with a similar prefunding strategy and 36
asset diversification policy . As shown in Chart 8, a strategy where real wage indexation would also be 
suspended from 007 to 017 and where the contribution rate would be adjusted from 4% to 6 .4% from 
008 onwards would induce about the same evolution of reserves as under the baseline funding scenario . 
However, such a scenario would have two decisive shortcomings . First, the required contribution rate would 
reach 6,4% at the end of the projection horizon, compared to 4% under the baseline funding scenario . 
Second, the funding process proposed in Table 4 presupposes the existence of an independent pension fund 
held accountable by individual pensioners and by monitoring institutions . Due to this commitment frame-
work, the Fund would always act in line with the actuarial equilibrium . By contrast, the “mimicking” solution 
presented in Chart 8 would not safeguard the pension system against time inconsistent behaviours . In some 
circumstances, the authorities might indeed depart from the actuarial equilibrium in order to reap some 
benefits in the short or medium term to the detriment of the long-term perspective of the pension system . 
The subsequent return to this long-term equilibrium is bound to be extremely painful once such a departure 
has taken place, thus the advantage of the commitment technology provided by funding . 
Chart 8 – Evolution of reserves and contributions in the baseline funding scenario 
(see Table 4), the “mimicking” scenario and the time inconsistency scenario 
1. Reserves as percentages of GDP
2. Contributions as percentages of gross incomes
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . 
Note: the baseline funding, mimicking and time inconsistent scenarios presented in the 
chart all presuppose that indexation of pensions to real wage developments is 
suspended from 007 to 017 . In addition, the real rate of return on assets is 
equal to 4 .4% in the three scenarios .37
A simple example illustrates the relevance of this time inconsistency problem within the “mimicking” 
strategy . It is assumed that the authorities are fully compliant with the mimicking strategy from 008 to 
06 . As reserves would have reached more than 90% of GDP in 06, which seems very comfortable 
in absolute terms, the authorities could be inclined to conduct a more lenient policy at this stage . By 
assumption, they would decrease contributions from 6 .4 to 0 .% of gross incomes from 07 onwards, 
0 .% being the contribution rate compatible with a new reserve target level equal to 50% of GDP in 
054 . Although such a target would a priori make sense in the short or even the medium term, it would 
totally disrupt the actuarial equilibrium of the pension system and lead to a cumulative deterioration of the 
budgetary situation of the pension system .
It is further assumed that in order to prevent such a downward spiral, the authorities would decide from 
055 onwards to revert to a more stringent policy . They would increase the contribution rate in a stepwise 
manner in order to put the system back on track at the end of the projection horizon, which means that the 
overall balance of the pension system would have to converge to 8% of GDP – namely the level estimated 
for the end of the projection horizon in the baseline funding and the mimicking scenarios . As illustrated in 
Chart 8, such a strategy would imply a contribution rate higher than 40% of gross wages at the end of the 
projection horizon . Should the contribution rate be capped to 4%, benefits would then have to adjust 
downwards in order to restore the budgetary situation . In this case, the wage replacement ratio would 
have to decrease from 90% in 054 to only about 40% by the end of the horizon .7Such a level would be 
well below the level considered appropriate in the literature .8
The projection presented in Table 4 rests on substantial prefunding, but on the other hand it exhibits many 
desirable features, much more so than a “mimicking” of the funding strategy within the current pension 
framework . An additional and decisive advantage of the baseline funding process, namely its relative insu-
lation from GDP growth inflexions, is reviewed below, in section 3 .3 .
3.3  A decisive advantage of the new baseline: GDP growth developments are miti-
gated under the funding scheme
In order to assess the resilience of the baseline funding scenario to macroeconomic developments, this 
scenario is reestimated conditionally on GDP growth rates above (i .e . 4%) and below (i .e .  .%) the 3% 
growth rate considered in the baseline . As explained in Chapter I, the annual inflow of immigrants is kept 
unchanged (4,000 persons a year), the number of cross-border workers being the residual variable .
The detailed results of the 4% growth and  .% growth scenarios are provided in Annex 3 . They are 
synthesised in Chart 9 and Table 5 . Chart 9 compares the evolution of the total required financing (namely 
the contribution to the NF plus the remaining cost of PAYG pension benefits) under the funding system with 
the contribution rate required under a “wait-and-see” strategy, where pension benefits are fully indexed to 
real wage developments, where no asset diversification strategy is adopted and where contribution rates 
are revised upwards only when pension reserves fall under the legal requirement – namely 1 .5 times the 
amount of annual pension benefits – over successive 7-year periods .9 The two strategies are assessed 
conditionally on the three GDP growth scenarios (4%, the baseline 3% and  .%) . The results highlight 
once more that the funding process depicted in Table 4 is a winning strategy over the long term, by a wide 
margin and whatever the growth scenario considered . Contribution rates are lower and at the same time 
2 The increase in contribution or the downward adjustment of benefits would be even more drastic should the authorities target 
a 65% of GDP reserve ratio in 2085 (namely the prospective ratio in the baseline funding scenario and also – by definition – in 
the mimicking scenario). For instance, the contribution rate would reach about 50% of gross income at the end of the projection 
horizon in this case.
28 See for instance OECD (2005).
2 Both the .5 criterion and the -year successive periods are provided for in Article 28 of Code des Assurances Sociales.38
reserves are much more substantial than under the wait-and-see strategy . Another crucial message is that 
the contribution rate – or more exactly the total required financing –  is much more sensitive to growth 
rates under the wait-and-see strategy than in the funding case . A simple look at Chart 9 and Table 5 
shows that the required financing does not differ in a significant way in the three funding cases, but that 
this pattern does not hold under the alternative strategy . The terminal contribution rate indeed ranges from 
30 .8 to 39 .% in the wait-and-see case and from 3 .5 to 5 .8% under funding . Stated otherwise, funding 
provides an appropriate protection against GDP growth inflections . The buffer is extremely effective, since 
the impact of shocks to GDP growth on the terminal contribution rates would decline by 50 to 90% (by 80 
to 90% from the yardstick of average contribution rates) compared to the wait-and-see strategy .  
Chart 9 – Evolution of the required financing of the pension system 
(funding and remaining PAYG) under alternative growth scenarios
As percentages of gross incomes
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . 
Table 5 – Average and terminal required financing under funding and 
the wait-and-see strategy
As percentages of gross incomes, between brackets: differences with respect to the baseline 3% GDP growth scenario
Funding strategy Wait-and-see strategy
GDP growth Average 2008/’85 Rate in 2085 Average 2008/’85 Rate in 2085
4 .0% 5 .7% (-0 .3%) 3 .5% (-0 .5%) 6 .9% (-4 .0%) 30 .8% (-4 .9%)
3 .0% 6 .0% 4 .0% 30 .9% 35 .7%
 .% 6 .7% (+0 .7%) 5 .8% (+1 .8%)31 34 .6% (+3 .7%) 39 .% (+3 .5%)
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . Based on Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) .30
This “shock absorber” property of the funding system as far as GDP growth is concerned is attributable to 
the “reserve dilution effect” already mentioned above and highlighted in Annex 4 . The numerator of the 
reserve ratio increases with the overall surplus of the pension system, but the denominator – basically the 
wage bill – grows in line with inflation, the real wage and employment growth . Since real wage growth is 
assumed to be equal to productivity growth in the BCL pension model, which is a particularly reasonable 
assumption over a long-term horizon, the denominator increases in line with nominal GDP growth . Ceteris 
0 This difference may appear significant compared to the opposite % scenario. This is due to the 2% contribution cap, which is 
more tightening in the 2.2% growth case, where a larger prefunding would in principle be required. This contributes to increase 
the steady state, terminal financing rate. In spite of this bias, the .8% difference is well below the .5% difference observed 
under the wait-and-see strategy.39
paribus, it therefore requires a lower overall surplus to maintain the reserve ratio at the same level when 
GDP growth is lower (see equations (6) and (7) in Annex 4) . This favourable evolution will offset to a large 
extent the adverse impact on the steady state contribution rate of the evolution of the pension cost ratio, 
which is higher under the low growth scenario than under the alternative scenarios . 








* , where c is the equilibrium contribution rate, p the pension cost ratio, r the equilibrium 
reserve ratio compatible with the steady state and with the present value budget constraint, g the nominal 
growth rate and d the nominal return (namely 6 .4% by assumption, namely 4 .4% in real terms) .
Lower GDP growth contributes to increase the contribution rate due to its adverse impact on the pension 




1 , as the numerator of this 
ratio is much more sensitive to g than the denominator . The equilibrium asset ratio r also tends to decrease 
when growth is lower, which further enhances the dampening effect .31
All in all, the steady state contribution rate increases (decreases) when GDP growth decelerates (acceler-
ates) in the scenario depicted in Chart 9 and Table 5, but the net impact is far less pronounced than in 
the “non funded” situations owing to the favourable (adverse) impact of the asset dilution phenomenon . 
Most interestingly, this dampening factor is proportional to the reserve ratio r . In the extreme case where 
this ratio is equal to zero the asset dilution phenomenon is neutralised and the higher cost ratio induced 
by lower growth is no longer kept in check . The dilution effect even takes on the opposite sign when 
reserves turn negative – namely when the pension system incurs liabilities – which magnifies the adverse 
consequences of lower growth . 
The impact of economic growth on the speed of the transition to funding also contributes to buffer growth 
inflexions . As explained in Annex 1, the speed of the transition is calculated in a separate way for resident 
and cross-border employees . Higher economic growth therefore implies larger inflows of cross-border 
workers in the BCL model . Since the average length of their carrier is relatively short,  higher economic 
growth contributes to accelerate the transition of employees from PAYG to funding . This acceleration 
implies a lesser accumulation of assets at the beginning of the funding process, which contributes to 
increase social contributions in the steady state . Like the dilution effect, this factor alleviates the impact of 
GDP growth on the cost ratio, albeit to a lesser extent .3 
The “shock absorber” nature of funding a very attractive feature in a small open country like Luxembourg, 
which is particularly vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks and to financial market developments . In addition, 
the high surpluses and reserves inherent in funding would allow the authorities to address adverse shocks 
in a much more flexible manner than under tight budgetary constraints, as already explained above . The 
protecting nature of funding is therefore twofold .
 The lower required equilibrium reserve ratio under the low growth scenario, which reinforces the “shock absorber” nature of 
funding, can be explained based on the present value budget constraint.  The discount factor of future primary deficits is un-
changed, since it is equal to the nominal rate of return (i.e. .% plus .% inflation by assumption). However, the discounted 
value of future primary deficits will decrease much more quickly under the low growth scenario, because they increase at a more 
moderate pace in such a context – both pensions and contributions indeed tend to increase in line with nominal GDP growth in 
the long term. This impact will outweigh the higher “steady state” primary deficit ratios inherent in the low growth scenario.
2 The 2% cap on the total required financing contributes to dilute – but not to neutralise – this additional buffer. In this case, the 
accelerated transition of pensions to funding in case of higher economic growth leads to higher initial transfers to the Fund, in 
line with the quicker decline of the remaining PAYG cost (the initial transfers to the NF are indeed equal to 2% of gross incomes 
less this remaining cost). 40
3.4  Sensitivity analysis: yield on pension reserves and birth rates
The funding system is much less sensitive to GDP growth developments than alternative systems with 
lower reserves . However, the funding process presented above is of course conditional on a wide range 
of assumptions . The sensitivity of this process to two prominent risk factors, namely the average yield on 
reserves and demographic changes, is assessed in the following paragraphs .
3.4.1.  Sensitivity of the funding process to the choice of the benchmarks return rate
As explained in Annex , the benchmark real yield rate used in the projections is estimated in a rather 
conservative way . In spite of this downward bias, the baseline projection has been tested against two 
symmetric scenarios . Both scenarios are based on the very same hypotheses used in the baseline funding 
scenario depicted in Table 4, except the assumed real yield on reserves, which is set equal to respectively 
5 .4 and 3 .4% instead of the baseline 4 .4% . It should be kept in mind that a temporary departure from the 
benchmark would not alter the financial equilibrium of the pension system owing to the swap agreement 
between the pension system and the Treasury, as proposed by Modigniani and Muralidhar (004) . In addi-
tion, a departure confined to the short term would not change significantly the steady state equilibrium 
and therefore the related, long-term contribution rate . The two scenarios reviewed below presuppose a 
permanent drift away from the benchmark rate, which is far less likely than a temporary one .
A yield equal to 5 .4%, namely approximately the yield used by Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) in most 
of their projections centred on the United States, would of course ease the transition process . The steady 
state equilibrium contribution rate would converge to 17,4% of gross incomes, compared to 4% at 
present and also in the baseline funding scenario . The gap between primary pension expenditure and the 
contribution rate would grow to an unprecedented 1 .5% of gross incomes at the end of the projection 
horizon, but it would be filled by extremely comfortable property incomes – they would amount to 37% 
of gross incomes or 15% of GDP, compared to respectively 5 and 10% in the baseline funding scenario . 
Property incomes would also ensure that reserves remain stable at more than 00% of GDP . 
Chart 10 – Evolution of the required financing of the pension system 
(funding and remaining PAYG) under alternative return scenarios
As percentages of gross incomes
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations .41
The evolution would of course be less favourable under the 3 .4% real return scenario . In this case, the 
total required financing would have to reach 8 .3% of gross wages all over the projection horizon, which 
means that the 7% cap would have to be lifted . All in all, however, the transition process still appears 
achievable and much more commendable than the wait-and-see strategy depicted in Chart 9, where the 
terminal contribution rate reached close to 36% in the 3% GDP growth scenario . In addition, a systematic, 
permanent decline in average returns of a significant magnitude is quite limited if the NF portfolio is properly 
diversified . Moreover, even in case such a permanent drift would occur, it could be addressed to a certain 
extent within the diversification strategy presented in Annex  . This strategy relied on the rather conservative 
assumption that 35% of the NF portfolio would be invested in stocks, instead of 70% in the diversification 
strategy favoured by Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) . A downward drift in returns could be offset to a 
certain extent by adjusting the composition of the portfolio . In the context of this paper, the real average 
return would increase from 3 .4 to 4 .0% should the proportion of stocks be brought from 35 to 50% .33 In 
such a case, the 7% cap would no longer be binding from 065 onwards and the required financing would 
gradually converge to 6 .% of gross incomes at the end of the projection period . Finally, all the attractive 
patterns associated with funding, namely a high reserve ratio, comfortable surpluses and limited exposition 
to lower GDP growth, would be preserved even under the low return scenario with no asset rebalancing .
3.4.2.  Sensitivity of the funding process to demographic variables: the birth rate
The baseline funding scenario is very sensitive to the evolution of the pension cost ratio, which is itself 
conditional on the various assumptions presented in Chapter 1 . The impact of macroeconomic develop-
ments has already been analysed in depth in section 3 .3 . To a certain extent, socio-demographic variables 
were already analysed on this occasion . By construction, economic growth indeed directly affects the 
(residual) number of cross-border workers, whose age profile is quite similar to the age composition of 
immigrants . The last sensitivity analysis carried out in this paper is devoted to the incidence of birth rates 
on the baseline funding scenario . Higher (lower) birth rates should in principle ease (complicate) the transi-
tion process, since they would lower (increase) the cost ratio . 
Chart 11 – Evolution of the required financing rate under two alternative demographic 
scenarios
As percentages of gross incomes
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . 
 By assumption, real returns on stocks and risk-free assets would both decline by % compared to the assumptions made in 
Annex 2 and would therefore reach 6 and 2%, respectively. The average real return would therefore equal .% for the 5 
(stocks)/65% (risk-free) portfolio and .0% for the 50/50% portfolio.4
The impact of two alternative paths for the birth rate is synthesised in Chart 11 . The first path consists in 
an increase in the birth rate by 10% all over the projection horizon compared to the baseline scenario . 
The second one rests on a symmetric 10% decline . The sign of the impact on the contribution rate is in 
line with intuition, but all in all the magnitude of the impact is quite limited, for two reasons . First, the 
10% adjustment imposed at the beginning of the projection horizon will not have a decisive impact on 
the long-term budgetary situation of the pension system . For instance, additional births in 008 will have 
a positive impact on the working age population in the midst of the projection horizon, but they will also 
give way to new pension expenditure from about 065 onwards . Second, the projection is conducted on 
the assumption that economic growth is kept unchanged with respect to the baseline scenario (i .e . 3% 
GDP growth a year) . Under this assumption, the favourable impact of higher birth rates on the resident 
working force will be marched by an offsetting adjustment of the inflow of cross-border workers – which is 
the residual variable in the model . A relaxation of the unchanged GDP growth hypothesis would not have a 
large impact on the budgetary situation of the pension system, however . As explained in section 3 .3, GDP 
growth inflexions do not have a strong impact on the long-term equilibrium of the system under funding . 
Concluding remarks 
The Luxembourg private sector pension system is at crossroads . On the one hand, the current budgetary 
situation of the system appears extremely favourable . On the other hand, projections based on reasonable 
assumptions suggest that the pension regime is not sustainable over a long-term horizon . Under the base-
line BCL projection, the private regime would incur liabilities equal to about 160% of GDP in 085 . The 
corresponding figure would amount to 49% of GDP in 050 in the projections carried out in IGSS (006) 
conditionally on a 3% growth rate .
The primary objective of the paper was to assess the extent to which a solution proposed by Modigliani 
and Muralidhar (004), where pensioners are gradually transferred from PAYG to a public fund, is suitable 
to the Luxembourg situation, characterised inter alia by large inflows of cross-border workers . A baseline 
funding scenario designed in this paper in a stepwise manner and under reasonable return assumptions 
illustrates how fruitful such a solution could be in the Luxembourg case . In the steady state, the baseline 
funding scenario would lead to very comfortable reserves and budgetary surpluses with no cost in terms 
of long-term, equilibrium contribution rates . These very favourable results would be achieved in spite of a 
continuously increasing pension cost ratio due to ageing and to the gradual retirement of large contingents 
of cross-border workers . Owing to these very comfortable budgetary indicators, the Luxembourg general 
government considered as a whole (i .e . the central government, social security and local governments) 
would ceteris paribus be in position to record surpluses, as was the case over the 1990-003 period 
(except in 199) . The Luxembourg authorities would therefore be able to react in a much more flexible 
way to adverse economic events, without incurring the risk of breaching the 3% deficit reference value 
embedded in a protocol of the Treaty Establishing the European Community . Another particularly attractive 
feature of funding – especially in the context of a small and very open economy – is that it would mitigate 
in an effective way the impact on the pension regime of adverse GDP growth developments . 
Prefunding is required In order to reap this wide range of benefits . Such a frontloading strategy seems to be 
within the grasp of Luxembourg, which could resort to a variety of measures . The baseline funding projec-
tion presented in the paper serves an illustrative purpose and a wide range of prefunding measures could 
of course be considered . This projection is based on the illustrative assumptions that (i) the joint contribu-
tion of employees, employers and the central government would reach 7% of gross incomes before the 
actuarial equilibrium is reached – this could be achieved via higher central government transfers to the 
pension system, via alternative tax resources or through higher employee and employers contributions 43
with ad hoc adjustments in order not to detract from wage competitiveness – and (ii) the indexation of 
pensions to real wage developments would be suspended from 007 to 017 . The latter measure would 
not erode the purchasing power of pensions, as benefits would still be adjusted to price developments 
all over the projection horizon . The wage replacement ratio would decrease over the 007-017 period, 
but it would still be much higher than in the neighbouring countries . Moreover the baseline prefunding 
solution would retain the very same pension formula that is currently applied in Luxembourg . Finally, this 
scenario would preserve intergenerational fairness, whereas a wait-and-see strategy under the current 
system would strongly penalise the future generations of pensioners . The baseline funding scenario also 
requires a more dynamic asset diversification strategy . The virtuous interaction between prefunding and 
higher returns on assets is indeed the very distinctive feature of this scenario . 
The sensitivity analysis revealed that the baseline funding scenario is reasonably resilient to alternative 
return or demographic assumptions . However, even the funding system would have to be monitored in a 
continuous way . Like the present system, it is of course not immune from all adverse external shocks . For 
instance, periodic rebalancing of the investment strategy may have to be considered .
While there are transition costs to be incurred in order to ensure convergence of the private sector pension 
regime to a more stable funded system that is less vulnerable to adverse economic shocks, the danger 
of doing nothing is that the system will remain unstable and costs will be dramatically higher for future 
generations . Hence, while the problem may not appear to be immediate, doing nothing in not an option 
as it will pass on to our children the higher cost of fixing the system .44
Annex 1 – Calculation of the transition speed to the New Fund
The speed with which pensions will be transferred from the current PAYG regime to the funding system is 
of paramount importance, since it directly impacts the magnitude of the asset accumulation process at 
the beginning of the projection period . The percentage of pensions transferred has been calculated for 
residents and cross-border workers in a separate way . In addition, specific calculations or assumptions 
have been made for all pension categories, namely old age, disability and survival pensions (orphans and 
widows) and for each gender in a separate way . The transition rate is therefore inferred for six (twelve if 
genders are considered) subcategories, in accordance with the following steps:
•  The number of pensions and the average pension all over the 005-085 period are identified for each 
subcategory, using the BCL pension model .
•  The inflow of new pensioners from 008 onwards is then approximated for the abovementioned categories 
for each age cohort . First, for each year of the 008-085 horizon, changes in the number of pensioners 
is extracted from the pension model . The figures are then corrected for the impact of mortality . This 
ensures that the inferred numbers of new pensioners are fully consistent with the BCL pension model .
•  The cumulated number of new pensioners (i .e . the persons who will get retired in 008 or thereafter) 
is calculated all over the 008-085 horizon . For each vintage (year when pensioners will get retired), 
the number of pensioners is calculated all over this time horizon, taking into account the impact of 
mortality . For instance, the number of pensioners from the 008 vintage is equal to the inflow of new 
pensioners in 008 (see the previous bullet point) . The number of pensioners from the same 008 
vintage in 009 is equal to this figure, minus the number of persons who died in 009, and the same 
calculation in done for the rest of the projection horizon . The same calculation is done for each of the 
009 to 085 vintages .
•  The number of pensioners in each vintage (calculated all over the 008-085 period) is then multi-
plied by the average pension for the vintage . The resulting amounts are adjusted in order to take into 
account the split of their pension benefits into the two pension systems (i .e . PAYG and NF) . It is indeed 
assumed that pensions are transferred to the NF on a pro rata basis, depending on the relative weight 
in the carrier of contributory incomes earned from 1 January 008 onwards – as the pension reform 
would by assumption be implemented from this date . This means that assuming a 40-year career, the 
future pension benefits of employees who joined the insured population in December 1990 would be 
split between the PAYG system and the NF regime . 4 .5% (i .e . 17/40) would remain under the PAYG 
system . The remaining benefits would be paid by the NF . Pensions would by assumption be calculated 
in exactly the same way in the NF – which would be a defined benefit scheme – and in the PAYG 
system . The transition speed would be higher the shorter the average duration of the career, thus the 
quicker transition process for cross-border workers . Their assumed career is shorter than for residents 
at the beginning of the transition process, but in line with the pension model, it is assumed that the 
duration of their career will gradually converge to the duration assumed for resident employees .
•  The resulting amounts are summed up across all vintages for each year of the projection horizon . The 
085 amounts are calibrated in order to be equal to the total amount of pensions projected for this year 
in the pension model . The cumulated percentage of pensions transferred to the NF is then calculated all 
over the 008-085 period . The respective annual amounts (also adjusted with the 085 calibration 
coefficient) are divided by the corresponding total amount of pension benefits projected by the model . 
•  This calculation process is carried out in full for four categories, namely old age and disability pensions 
for residents and also for cross-border workers, based on the respective age profiles of new pensioners, 45
average pensions and average durations of careers . The transition coefficients for survival pensions are 
assumed equal to the corresponding coefficients inferred for old age pensions . Survival coefficients for 
men (women) are brought in line with old age coefficients for women (men) . 
•  The weighted sum of the transition vectors derived for each subcategory is then calculated . The weight 
depends on the proportion of pension benefits channelled to the different categories in the current 
pension system . The resulting aggregated vector of transition coefficients appears in columns 6 . of the 
funding tables presented in the paper . 
The transition coefficients inferred in this way are in line with the specificities of the Luxembourg pension 
system and the profile of present and future pensioners . In addition, the coefficients adjust in a flexible way 
to changes in the exogenous assumptions made in the projections . For instance, higher economic growth, 
which will result in a higher number of “residual” cross-border workers, will translate in higher transition 
coefficients – thus in a faster transition process – because of the lower average duration of the career of 
cross-border workers assumed at the beginning of the projection period . Due to these peculiarities, the 
transition would be quicker in the Luxembourg case than assumed in the simulation made by Modigliani 
and Muralidhar (004), as illustrated in the chart below . This will lead to a lesser accumulation of assets in 
the transition period and therefore to higher steady state contribution rates .
Chart A1.1 – Proportion of benefits transferred to the New Fund
As percentages of total pension benefits
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, Modigliani and Muralidhar (004), BCL calculations . 
Annex 2 – Choice of the benchmark real rate of return on NF assets
Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) base their funding projections on the assumption that the average real 
return on the assets of the pension system would be in the range 5-5 .5% . They demonstrate in Chapter 5 
that return series over the 196-000 period bear out this assumption in the U .S . According to Modigliani 
and Muralidhar, pre-tax returns on corporate capital before taxes, which is the appropriate measure in 
the funding context, would reach 8 to 8 .5% .  They also mention Poterba (1998), who argued “the pre-
tax return on capital in the corporate non-financial sector has averaged 8 .5 percent over the 1959-1996 
period” . Since their benchmark portfolio consists in equities for 70% and risk-free assets for the remaining 
30%, their average return equal to 5-5 .5% is considered quite reasonable .  46
The benchmark assumption made in this paper is more conservative . In order to comply with congruence, it 
is assumed that NF assets would be primarily invested in European equities, whose average return might be 
below the 8-8 .5% range considered by Modigliani and Muralidhar in the U .S . case . It is assumed in the paper 
is that the average pre-tax return on European equity would be equal to 7%, namely the middle of the afore-
mentioned 8-8 .5% range minus 1 .3%, i .e . the differential between the U .S . and European real rate of return 
on equities estimated in IMF (000) . It is further assumed that the real, risk-free interest rate would reach 3% . 
According to Bundesbank data on 10-year government bonds and on inflation over the 1973-005 period, the 
average real interest rate on these bonds reached 3 .4% once the outlier years 1984 to 1990 – characterised 
by very high real interest rates – are disregarded . The portfolio allocation is much more conservative than the 
70/30% benchmark portfolio of Modigliani and Muralidhar, since equities are confined to 35% of total pension 
assets throughout the projection horizon . The implicit return is therefore equal to 4 .4% all over the 008-085 
projection period (=7%*0 .35+3 .0%*0 .65) . Although stock markets real rate of return are subject to substantial 
variation from year to year, the volatility of returns tends to decline considerably over longer time horizons .
The congruence assumption is quite conservative and is used in order not to inflate the benchmark return 
used in the projections . A more diversified investment policy would be more appropriate over a long period, 
as it would contribute to increase returns without a commensurate increase in risks over such a long invest-
ment horizon . In addition, financial instruments such as strategic currency hedging make it possible to 
further alleviate risks with potentially higher yields . For a description of strategic currency hedging, see 
Muralidhar, Prajogi and van der Wouden (000) . It should finally be mentioned that the assets of the 
Government Pension Fund in Norway are invested in a very diversified way . As of 31 December 005, only 
53% of assets were invested in Europe – including the UK, Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden – and 6% 
in Asia/Oceania . The Americas and Africa accounted for the rest .
Several pieces of evidence also suggest that the return assumptions made in the paper are reasonable . First, 
as illustrated in the Chart below, the (nominal) return on European equities was in line with – or even above 
– the assumed 7% real return over the 1988-005 period . Second, the Government Pension Fund in Norway 
achieved a real rate of return equal to 4 .5% from 1997 to 005 after deduction for inflation and management 
costs .34 At the end of 005, equities represented 4% of the total assets at market value of the Fund .
Chart A2.1 – Nominal returns on European equities
As percentages
Average nominal return DAX: 9 .8% . CAC 40: 9 .0% . 
Average real return DAX: 8 .% . CAC 40: 6 .8% (after correction for the respective changes in the harmo-
nised indexes of consumer prices) .
 See Government Pension Fund (2005).47
Annex 3 – Detailed results of the projections related to the impact of growth inflexions
Table A 3.1 – Baseline funding scenario in case of a 4% GDP growth rate
























  1. 2. 3. =6.*7. 4.=1.+2.-3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.=1.+8. 10.=9.-7.
008 6 .0 4 .0 0 .0 10 .0 7 .8 0 . 0 .1 0 .0 6 .0 5 .9
009 6 .7 4 .4 0 .1 10 .9 79 .5 0 .6 19 .8 19 .6 6 .3 6 .5
010 7 .3 4 .8 0 . 11 .9 86 .8 1 .3 19 .5 19 . 6 .5 7 .0
011 7 .9 5 .3 0 .4 1 .8 94 .6  .1 19 . 18 .8 6 .7 7 .5
01 8 .7 5 .7 0 .6 13 .8 103 .0 3 .1 18 .9 18 .3 7 .0 8 .1
013 9 . 6 . 0 .8 14 .6 111 .8 4 .3 18 .6 17 .8 7 .0 8 .4
014 9 .7 6 .8 1 .1 15 .4 10 .8 5 .8 18 .4 17 .3 7 .0 8 .6
015 10 . 7 .3 1 .3 16 . 130 . 7 .4 18 . 16 .8 7 .0 8 .9
016 10 .7 7 .9 1 .6 17 .0 139 .8 9 .1 17 .9 16 .3 7 .0 9 .1
017 11 . 8 .5 1 .9 17 .7 149 .6 10 .9 17 .7 15 .8 7 .0 9 .3
018 11 .7 9 .1  .3 18 .5 159 .8 1 .9 17 .5 15 .3 7 .0 9 .5
019 11 .7 9 .7  .7 18 .7 169 .5 15 .0 18 .0 15 .3 7 .0 9 .0
00 1 .3 10 .3 3 .1 19 .5 179 .5 17 .5 17 .8 14 .7 7 .0 9 .
01 1 .3 10 .9 3 .7 19 .5 188 .9 0 .0 18 .4 14 .7 7 .0 8 .6
0 1 .9 11 .5 4 .1 0 . 198 .6  .6 18 .3 14 .1 7 .0 8 .7
03 1 .9 1 .0 4 .8 0 . 07 .8 5 . 18 .8 14 .1 7 .0 8 .
04 13 .5 1 .6 5 . 0 .9 17 .1 8 .0 18 .7 13 .5 7 .0 8 .3
05 13 .6 13 . 6 .0 0 .8 5 .7 30 .8 19 .4 13 .4 7 .0 7 .6
06 14 . 13 .7 6 .5 1 .4 34 .6 33 .5 19 .3 1 .8 7 .0 7 .7
07 14 .3 14 . 7 . 1 .3 4 .8 36 .3 0 .0 1 .7 7 .0 7 .0
08 14 .9 14 .7 7 .7 1 .9 51 .1 38 .9 19 .9 1 .1 7 .0 7 .
09 15 .0 15 . 8 .5 1 .7 58 .9 41 .5 0 .5 1 .0 7 .0 6 .5
030 15 .6 15 .7 9 .0  .3 66 .9 44 . 0 .4 11 .3 7 .0 6 .6
035 17 .7 17 .9 1 .3 3 .3 30 .5 56 .8 1 .7 9 .4 7 .0 5 .4
040 0 .1 19 .9 14 .9 5 .1 334 .8 68 . 1 .8 6 .9 7 .0 5 .
045  .1 1 .8 17 .7 6 . 365 . 78 .4  .6 4 .9 7 .0 4 .4
050 3 .5 3 .6 19 .5 7 .6 394 .7 86 .  .6 3 .1 6 .6 4 .0
055 3 .5 5 .1 1 .6 7 .0 417 . 9 .0 3 .5 1 .9 5 .4 1 .9
060 3 .5 6 .1  .4 7 . 433 .4 95 .7 3 .4 1 .0 4 .5 1 .1
065 3 .5 6 .8 3 .6 6 .7 444 .4 97 .8 4 . 0 .5 4 .0 0 .0
070 3 .5 7 .3 3 .8 7 .1 45 .6 98 .8 4 .1 0 .3 3 .8 0 .0
075 3 .5 7 .7 4 .7 6 .5 458 .1 99 . 4 .9 0 . 3 .7 0 .0
080 3 .5 7 .9 4 .8 6 .7 461 .5 99 .6 4 .9 0 .1 3 .6 0 .0
081 3 .5 8 .0 5 .3 6 .1 461 .6 99 .7 5 .4 0 .1 3 .6 0 .0
08 3 .5 8 .0 5 .0 6 .5 46 .1 99 .7 5 .0 0 .1 3 .6 0 .0
083 3 .5 8 .0 5 .5 6 .0 46 .0 99 .8 5 .6 0 .0 3 .6 0 .0
084 3 .5 8 .0 5 .1 6 .4 46 .3 99 .9 5 . 0 .0 3 .5 0 .0
085 3 .5 8 .0 5 .7 5 .8 46 .1 100 .0 5 .7 0 .0 3 .5 0 .0
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . Based on Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) .48
Table A 3.2 – Baseline funding scenario in case of a 2.2% GDP growth rate
























  1. 2. 3. =6.*7. 4.=1.+2.-3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.=1.+8. 10.=9.-7.
008 5 .7 4 .1 0 .0 9 .8 73 .4 0 . 0 .3 0 .3 6 .0 5 .7
009 6 . 4 .5 0 .1 10 .5 80 .7 0 .6 0 .3 0 .1 6 .3 6 .0
010 6 .6 5 .0 0 . 11 .3 88 .4 1 . 0 . 0 .0 6 .5 6 .3
011 6 .9 5 .4 0 .4 1 .0 96 .5  .0 0 . 19 .8 6 .7 6 .5
01 7 .5 5 .9 0 .6 1 .8 105 . 3 .0 0 .1 19 .5 7 .0 6 .9
013 7 .7 6 .5 0 .8 13 .3 114 .1 4 .1 0 .1 19 .3 7 .0 6 .9
014 8 .0 7 .0 1 .1 13 .9 13 . 5 .5 0 .1 19 .0 7 .0 6 .9
015 8 .3 7 .6 1 .4 14 .4 13 .6 6 .9 0 .1 18 .7 7 .0 6 .9
016 8 .6 8 . 1 .7 15 .0 14 . 8 .5 0 .1 18 .4 7 .0 6 .9
017 8 .9 8 .8  .1 15 .6 15 .0 10 .3 0 . 18 .1 7 .0 6 .8
018 9 . 9 .4  .4 16 .1 16 .0 1 .1 0 . 17 .8 7 .0 6 .8
019 8 .9 10 .0 3 .0 15 .9 171 .4 14 .1 1 .0 18 .1 7 .0 5 .9
00 9 .3 10 .6 3 .4 16 .4 181 .0 16 .3 1 .1 17 .7 7 .0 5 .9
01 9 .1 11 . 4 .1 16 .1 189 .9 18 .7  .0 17 .9 7 .0 5 .0
0 9 .5 11 .7 4 .7 16 .5 198 .9 1 .0  . 17 .5 7 .0 4 .8
03 9 .3 1 .3 5 .4 16 .1 07 . 3 .5 3 . 17 .7 7 .0 3 .8
04 9 .7 1 .8 6 .0 16 .5 15 .6 5 .9 3 .3 17 .3 7 .0 3 .7
05 9 .5 13 .3 7 .0 15 .9 3 .1 8 .5 4 .4 17 .5 7 .0  .6
06 10 .0 13 .8 7 .6 16 .1 30 .5 30 .9 4 .6 17 .0 7 .0  .4
07 9 .8 14 . 8 .6 15 .5 37 .1 33 .4 5 .7 17 .1 7 .0 1 .
08 10 .4 14 .6 9 .3 15 .7 43 .6 35 .8 5 .9 16 .6 7 .0 1 .1
09 10 .3 15 .0 10 .3 15 .0 49 . 38 .1 7 .0 16 .7 7 .0 0 .0
030 10 .9 15 .4 11 .0 15 . 54 .8 40 .6 7 .1 16 .1 7 .0 0 .0
035 1 .4 16 .7 15 .7 13 .5 74 . 51 .8 30 . 14 .6 7 .0 0 .0
040 15 .3 17 .4 19 .5 13 . 84 .5 6 .4 31 .3 11 .8 7 .0 0 .0
045 17 .9 17 .8 3 .6 1 . 89 .5 7 .3 3 .6 9 .0 7 .0 0 .0
050 0 .8 18 .0 6 .1 1 .8 93 .6 80 .9 3 .3 6 . 7 .0 0 .0
055 3 .1 18 .3 9 .0 1 .4 98 .0 88 .1 33 .0 3 .9 7 .0 0 .0
060 4 .9 18 .6 30 . 13 .3 303 .3 93 .3 3 .3  .1 7 .0 0 .0
065 5 .8 19 .0 31 .8 13 .0 308 .6 96 .8 3 .8 1 .1 6 .9 0 .0
070 5 .8 19 . 31 .7 13 .4 31 .9 98 .5 3 . 0 .5 6 .3 0 .0
075 5 .8 19 .4 3 .7 1 .6 315 . 99 . 3 .9 0 .3 6 .1 0 .0
080 5 .8 19 .5 3 .3 13 .1 316 .8 99 .5 3 .4 0 .1 6 .0 0 .0
081 5 .8 19 .5 3 .9 1 .4 316 .6 99 .6 33 .0 0 .1 5 .9 0 .0
08 5 .8 19 .5 3 .3 13 .0 317 .0 99 .7 3 .4 0 .1 5 .9 0 .0
083 5 .8 19 .5 33 .0 1 .4 316 .8 99 .8 33 .1 0 .1 5 .9 0 .0
084 5 .8 19 .5 3 .4 13 .0 317 . 99 .9 3 .4 0 .0 5 .9 0 .0
085 5 .8 19 .6 33 .0 1 .3 316 .9 100 .0 33 .0 0 .0 5 .8 0 .0
Sources: STATEC, IGSS, ILO, BCL calculations . Based on Modigliani and Muralidhar (004) .49
Annex 4 – Analytical appendix the present value budget constraint and the steady 
state equilibrium
The primary objective of this appendix is to demonstrate that the asset ratios and balances compatible 
with the present value budget constraint (PVBC) are strictly identical to the steady state level of these 
ratios and balances, and that the transition path to funding presented in Table 4 above is fully compat-
ible with long-term sustainability and the actuarial equilibrium of the private sector pension regime . The 
equilibriums presented in the paper indeed fulfil two constraints . First, they give way to an asset ratio that 
is at the same time stable over the long-term and compatible with the PVBC . As shown below (see equa-
tions (3) and (4)), the magnitude of the asset ratio depends in a quite linear way on the “targeted” primary 
balance . The lower the “targeted” primary balance of the pension system (thus the higher the primary 
deficit), the higher the equilibrium asset ratio . Second, the primary balance – and therefore the contribu-
tion rate – must be high enough to ensure a sufficient accumulation of assets during the transition period . 
This guarantees that the equilibrium reserve ratio will be reached after the transition period has elapsed . 
The first constraint could be complied with even under a low “steady state” contribution rate c . However, 
this would require a large accumulation of assets in the transition period and therefore high contribution 
rates during this period in order to satisfy the second constraint . Such a dichotomy in the evolution of 
contribution rates is rejected in the paper, where contributions are converging to their steady state level in 
a “gentle” way over the projection period .
A4.1.  Asset ratio compatible with the present value budget constraint


















Where Rt is the outstanding amount of reserves in year t, P the level of pension (and assimilated) expendi-
ture, C the amount of social contributions flowing to the private sector pension system and d the nominal 
rate of return (i .e . 6 .4% in the baseline projection) . The PVBC states that the amount of reserves in year 
t should be equal to the present value of all future primary deficits of the pension system . If this level of 
reserves is reached, the future primary gaps will be closed owing to the generated property incomes .



















1   ()
where g is the annual and nominal rate of growth of gross contributory incomes (and also of GDP if the 
real growth of wages is in line with productivity) .
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Equation () could be interpreted as the sum of the terms of a geometric progression . By definition, the 










where an is the last term of a geometric progression, a1 the first one and q the progression factor . The 






1  . If g<d, an is equal to zero in the situation depicted in (), 
because the geometric progression goes to infinity in this specific case . The general formula for geometric 
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  (3) 
where g and d could be expressed either in real or in nominal terms (the inflation factor indeed cancels 
out in the formula) .
Equation (3) makes it clear that the asset ratio compatible with the PVBC is positive provided that d (the 
return) is higher than g (the rate of economic growth) . Furthermore, there is no equilibrium if d is equal to 
g . In normal circumstances, namely if d>g, the asset ratio will be positive and proportional to the primary 
deficit ratio observed in the longer term . There are several asset ratios PVBC r  compatible with the PVBC, 
depending on the long-term primary deficit – basically on the chosen contribution rate c . However, it 
should be borne in mind that a higher future primary deficit ratio also requires more substantial reserves, 
which presupposes a larger prefunding effort . A zero asset ratio is also a possible equilibrium, but such a 
solution requires that the contribution rate c be kept equal to the pension cost ratio p .
A4.2.  Asset ratio in the steady state equilibrium
It is of paramount importance for the NF to reach the steady state equilibrium, where property incomes will 
be sufficient to ensure that the asset level remains stable . 
By definition,  ) ( ) 1 ( * 1 C P d R R t t − − + = −  or, after division by It ,  ) (
1
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r r t t − −
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* 1 1 1 , this equation can be rewritten 
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By definition, in the steady state  0 1 = − − t t r r (required stability of the asset ratio) and 
_
1 r rt = − , namely 












The steady state equilibrium 
_
r  is therefore strictly equal to the asset ratio 
PVBC r  . This is a crucial 
property. It indeed means that the stabilisation of asset ratios at the end of the projection horizon and 
even beyond is an appropriate target, compatible with the PVBC over the long-term and therefore with 
the actuarial equilibrium of the pension regime. This target ensures a smooth continuum between the 
asset ratios at the end of the projection horizon and the steady state equilibrium.
A4.3.  Overall balances compatible with the PVBC and the steady state equilibrium
Balance and asset ratio have to stabilise in tandem in the steady state . This equilibrium is also compatible 
with the PVBC as defined in A4 .1 . 
By definition, the overall balance  ) ( * 1 C P R d B t t − − = − , namely property incomes minus the 
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In the PVBC equilibrium, replacing  1 − t r by 















=   (6)
PVBC b is the overall balance compatible with the PVBC equilibrium and with the reserve ratio 
PVBC r .











=   (7)
The equilibrium balance ratio is proportional to the equilibrium asset ratio . In addition, for a given equilib-
rium asset ratio, the required balance is more demanding the higher the rate of economic growth . This is 
due to the “asset dilution effect” of economic growth mentioned in the paper, which contributes to alle-
viate the vulnerability of the funding system to adverse inflexions in GDP growth (see section 3 .3) .
A4.4.  Quantification under the baseline funding scenario
Under the baseline funding scenario depicted in Table 4 the contribution rate is calibrated in order to 
ensure that there will be a strict continuum between the budgetary indicators projected at the very end of 
the projection horizon on the one hand and the equilibrium level of the same indicators on the other hand . 
This ensures that the scenario is fully sustainable over the long-term or, stated otherwise, that there is no 
underfunding at the end of the projection period . The contribution rate c is set on the assumption that the 5
primary balance will become constant at the average level projected for 084-085 over the long-term . 
The average cost ratio over the two-year period 084 -085 is considered because the pension cost ratio 
is somewhat inflated in 085 due to the advent of a -year indexation to real wages . Averaging 085 
with a year where no indexation will take place ensures that this bias is removed .
In the baseline funding scenario, the constant contribution rate to the NF that guarantees a transition 
to the long-term equilibrium (reserves compatible with future primary deficits and with the steady state 
equilibrium), namely c, is equal to 4 .0% . The average pension cost ratio projected for 084 and 085 is 
equal to   or 9 .8% of gross incomes . The long-term primary deficit (p-c) is in turn 
equal to 5 .8% of gross incomes . Since by assumption d=6 .4% in nominal terms (and 4,4% in real terms) 
and g=4 .96% (3 .0% in real terms), equation (3) or indifferently (4) above gives the following equilibrium 
level of assets:
 416% of gross incomes or 165% of GDP .
In line with equations (6) and (7) the corresponding equilibrium overall balance is equal to 
 19 .7% of gross incomes or 8 .0% of GDP .
The equilibrium characterised by the conjunction of 5 .8% primary deficit, 19 .7% overall balance and 416% 
reserves is exactly the situation that would prevail at the end of the projection horizon in the baseline 
funding scenario (see Table 4, average 084-085) . This illustrates that the transition path to funding 
proposed in this scenario is fully compatible with long-term sustainability and the actuarial equilibrium of 
the pension system .53
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